Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical Ideal of Plutarch and of the Greeks of the First Century A. D.

A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Ph. D., at the University of Michigan.

By

GEORGE DEPUE HADZSITS.

1906
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(NOTE: We have taken all of our words through all of the following indices and lexica; supplementing this with wide reading, we have gathered the passages in which the terms are found. The discussion deals with each term separately, giving an historical treatment of the significance, meaning and development of each term. This work, it need hardly be added, does not lay claim to finality.)

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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

It is not our purpose to give a detailed account of the historical conditions in Greece in the first century of our era, but rather, to sketch those conditions briefly, with a view merely to establishing the necessary environment for our subsequent study of certain ethical ideas that gained favor in that century. The interrelation of these is obvious, and just as the moral ideal was largely shaped by that environment within which it grew, so it reacted upon its own environment and was, in part, responsible for the trend of events.

In general, the century was one of peace for Greece, greater than she had enjoyed since the days of the Macedonian, but it was hardly a condition that encouraged great effort; it was, rather, the peace of exhaustion, with but a minimum of stimulus derived from her great western conqueror.

Politically, *economically*, *socially*, the status of Greece in the first century A. D., was that of a conquered province, enfeebled, smitten with the consciousness of defeat, in the main quite fairly treated by Rome and often flattered, through all maintaining a great measure of self-esteem and pride.

Despite a technical freedom, Greece's *political* position was insignificant; while the Greek cities felt that they were governing themselves[1], since the management of police, building, public worship, games, instruction, taxation and lesser legal administration were left to their own direction, yet the power of the Roman emperor and of his governor was ever present to interfere; there were no other channels of public activity into which men might direct their energies except those of municipal administration, and, in that age, such were narrow enough limits for ambition, and even within these freedom was conditional. Yet Rome, a generous

1. Tac. Ann. xii. 58; Plin. Ep. x. 56; Liv. xlv. 18, 29; Paus. viii. 30. 9.

master in this instance, treated the cities of Greece with a consideration which was extended to no other conquered lands; and in the free cities she interfered as little as possible with the affairs of government. Even of Domitian[2] it was said "Provinciarum praesidibus coercendis tantum curae adhibuit, ut neque modestiores umquam neque iustiores exstiterint". At one time the Phil-Hellene Nero[3] had even gone to the extreme of declaring Greece subject to no governor and free from tribute. Hadrian also went to great lengths and the settled calm of Greece affords a striking contrast to the restlessness of the tribes on the Euphrates, on the Danube, and in Great Britain. Among other reasons for such conduct on the part of Rome, there existed the fact of "far greater similarity between the Greek and Roman spirit of municipal government than affinity with either the Eastern spirit of monarchical rule or the Northern spirit of personal freedom". Notwithstanding such favors, the calm that existed in Greece was not the calm of freedom and of self-government, but the calm of submission, of indifference, of exhaustion!

Greece was utterly incapable of benefiting from the idea of Pan-Hellenism[4] imposed from without, and the numerous beneficial acts of Hadrian, in the way of roads, aqueducts, temples, baths, when Athens was, perhaps, externally more splendid than ever before, did not improve her *economic* condition, neither increasing the resources of the land nor appreciably improving the condition of the industrial classes. In some cases, communities lacked the means to keep even the existing public works in repair. The land was only moderately fertile, agriculture was of limited extent, vine-culture was unimportant[5], and that of the olive, little less so; the marble quarries did not benefit the general population, nor were there any manufactures of significance.

2. Suet. Dom. 8; true of other emperors, Tac. Ann. iii. 10, Suet. Claud. 14, 15.

3. Vespasian annulled these acts, Paus. Ach. vii. 17.2.

4. Keil. Syll. Inser. B. 31, Plut. Arist. 19, C. I. G. 5852, Dion Cass. lxix. 10, Waddington iii.i.807, Paus. i.18.9.

5. Liv. xxxi. 24. Strabo & Paus., passim. Lampridius, in Alex. p. 122.

The financial administration of the Romans produced disastrous consequences both on the material prosperity of the country and on the moral constitution of society; the government of Rome was so lax, that mismanagement and robbery often went unpunished[6]. While Asia Minor and Syria recovered their commercial prosperity, Greece lagged behind; Corinth and Patrae were the chief centers of real activity in Greece, but they flourished only because they were Roman colonies and were important to Rome. Athen's supremacy was completely gone. Under the rule of the Flavian[7] emperors, the Roman system of financial administration and of taxation was directly responsible for reducing Greece to her lowest state of poverty and depopulation. The tendencies of society were toward the accumulation[8] of property in the hands of a few; "latifundia" had destroyed the yeomanry; the gulf between the few rich noble families and the great body of poor was widened. There was a general accumulation of debts throughout the country[9]. The depopulation[10] of the country, dating from the destruction of Thebes, of Corinth and Megara, was appalling, and even the masculine type had declined[11]. On every hand there were signs of the economic distress, decay, exhaustion[12], which Rome could not have stayed, had she so willed.

While thus in politics there was no opportunity or at least but slight encouragement for the exercise of talent, while economic conditions offered no inducements to ambition, —*socially*, the position of Greece was very unimportant in the world. In art, philosophy and literature, in which she expressed her truer, better self, Greece was still mistress of the world. It was because of her primacy in these, that she returned the scorn of the Roman people with a disdain, equally unjustifiable. Despite the supremacy of Greece in such matters, the Romans failed to appreciate the Greeks

6. Cic. In. Verr. i.2, Tac. Ann. i.76, Suet. Claud. 25.
7. Paus. Ach. vii, 17. 2. Suet. Vesp. 8.
8. Tac. Ann. xv. 20. Strabo. x. 2.25.
9. Plut. "De vitando aere alieno".
10. Strabo. ix. 1.15., ix. 2.25, viii and x. passim, Plut. De Def. Or. c. 8.
11. Dio. Orat. 21. 501. R.
12. Suet. Tib. 32, Juv. S. viii. 87, Cic. ad fam. 4.5.4. Philo. ii. 302. 12.

as a people, who were included in a general sentence of condemnation of the whole East and who were misunderstood, by reason of the baser types that appeared in large numbers from the East, in Rome. The Greeks of Hellas had no social standing in Rome. There was, to be sure, great decline in vigor, and moral energy was seriously threatened, if not, perhaps, undermined; there was a decline of families, and the Greek world had all the petty weaknesses and vices that naturally exist in a secluded[13], overripe and decaying society. Yet Juvenal was *not* acquainted with the *best* in the Greek nature, and Tacitus' stricture was one-sided[14].

The Greek world was by no means hopelessly lost, even after the political and economic death and social decline. In the arts, in literature, in philosophy, Greece lived again and gave evidence of a fine nature and culture, in which old traditions were fondly blended with new ideals. It is a well-known fact that "the defeated Hellenism . . . . . still created the conceptions by means of which the new religion shaped itself into a dogma"[15]. The Greek's *attitude toward God* powerfully affected his *relation toward his fellow-man;* it is his *ethical ideal* in the first century of our era that constitutes the subject of the following prolegomena.

13. Lucian, Cataplus i. 351.
4. Tac. Hist. iii. 47, Ann. ii. 55., Plin. Ep. x. 49, Dion Cass. liv. 7.
15. Windelband.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND OF METHODS.

We have made the ethical vocabulary of Plutarch[1] the basis of our study of this problem of the ethical ideal of the Greek of the first century A. D. Reading the "Moralia" of Plutarch, one very soon becomes conscious of the presence of a large number of ethical terms that do not belong to the classical vocabulary. These words are so numerous and their character so varied that it at once becomes apparent that they must be of considerable significance. Upon closer investigation[2], it appears that some of these ethical terms occur for the first time in literature, in Polybius and in the Septuagint, while others seem to appear, first, in the first century B. C., and others till not later in Plutarch and his contemporaries; as these terms are also found in the N. T., in inscriptions[3], in ecclesiastical literature for a long period of several hundred years, and, further, have a place in the modern Greek vocabulary, it is clear that they are not merely ephemeral terms, begotten of either local or sporadic or short-lived needs, but are the product of a deep-seated, vital disturbance in the ethical consciousness; the thought interest and activity behind the words was strong and imperative, and, as we shall see, the ethical movement, of much impor-

1. Plutarch represents the spirit of his age better than any of his contemporaries, reflecting not only the personal equation, but also "die Resultate der ethischen Reflexion eines ganzen Zeitalters" (Schmidt, p. 40). It is all the more possible to study the religious, political, philosophical, ethical problems of the age through the works of the sage of Chaeronea, as his outlook was broad and his interpretation, mild.

2. We have, by means of lexica and indices and wide readings determined, with considerable accuracy, the time and place limits within which these terms were employed.

3. Our inscriptional evidence has not yet been organized, nor is it directly applied in the later discussions; its value is very great, however, and the popular, oral currency,—the colloquial character of many of these ethical terms is demonstrated.

tance. A study of these terms should, then, throw some light upon the problem of the status of morals in Greece, in the Plutarchean age.

With Plutarch occupying the central point in this study of ethical ideas, some of which existed even before his day, and all of which lived long after his time[4], we find that every one of the terms considered is an expression of an ethical movement that was operating in Greek life and thus exerting a pressure upon the old vocabulary. While it may, perhaps, be impossible to say, precisely, how far the ethical ideas were assimilated and how far they became a part of the common intelligence, at any rate, it becomes very evident that these words are expressions of virtues that were admired and cultivated and of vices that were condemned by the Greek people of the first century, and represent the working of positive forces in the development of the race[5].

The discussion that follows takes into account the following terms: καινολογία, εὑρεσιλογία, ταπεινός, ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιία, κοινωφελία, μεγαλωφελία, μεγαλοεργία, κενοδοξία, περιαυτολογία, κενοσπουδία, ματαιοπονία, μισαδελφία, κοσμοπολίτης, πειθήνιος, ἠθοποιία[6].

4. We have, of course, in the case of every word, carefully considered every passage in which that term was found, noting, in some cases, a growth in the meaning of the word.

5. The new ethical vocabulary is only a part of a larger body of new terms that the Greek language, in becoming a world-instrument, created, when demands were made upon it, to express the conceptions that came with a wider experience; this process had been notably in effect since the days of the Roman conquest and Polybius shows many signs of it. A complete study of this new vocabulary, in its entirety, though important, does not fall within our province.

6. This list of words is but a small, though significant portion of the entire new ethical vocabulary, which may receive some illustration from the following terms: ὑπακοή, ἀκενόδοξον, εὐπρόσδεκτος, μακροθυμία, ἀπειραγαθία, φιλόκαινος, φιλοκομπία, φιληδονία, φιλαθλητής, πλουτοποιός, μεγαλοπάθεια, πολυπάθεια, ὀλιγοπράγμων, μεγαλοποιέω, ὀλιγόφρων, ξενομανέω, μικρόλυπος, ἀλλοτριοπραγία, προπάθεια, παραχωρητικός, δυσήκοος, ὀλιγόφρων, —ἀνόλεηπτος, οἴνωσις, μοιχικός, τοκογλύφος, ἀικοδέσποινα, χρεωφειλέτης, ἀμέθυστος, —μεγαλορρημοσύνη, φιλειδήων, γλισχρολογία, ἑτοιμολόγος, καταλαλία, καταφρυάσσομαι, ἀργολογία, —προσεπιζητέω, προσεπισημαίνω, συνεπιθρηνέω, ἐνεπιδείκνυμι, συνεκπλήσσω, συμφιλοτιμέομαι, συνεπιθειάζω, συνεκδέχομαι, εὐμετάθετος, εὐμετάδοτος, εὐμετάστατος, προσεκτυφλόω, προαπολείπω,

It is our belief that a philological-psychological study of the mental state of the Greeks of the first century, furnishes valuable clues, tending to elucidate the obscure problems of Greek ethics and religion of that period. An insight into the inner life of thought and feeling of the Greek people may enable us to apprehend the true nature of a very complex age, by no means as yet thoroughly understood.

Anticipating the statement of our conclusions, it may perhaps be apposite to state, here, that one might seriously doubt the validity of the generalization that the Greek society of this era was "a fossil society, feeding upon its own traditions and petrified beyond the hope of renovation or healthy growth"[7]. Nor is it absolutely true that "the ideal of the Conscience belonged to the great foe of Greece"[8]. Rather, that very ideal was growing and developing within the limits of Greek experience, and as shown by the language,

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σανανασώζω, καταπροίεμαι,—διαπικραίνομαι, ἐκπαθής, περιπαθής, διαγριαίνω, κατευλογέω, ἐκταπεινόω. The constant reference to *private* affairs and virtues is noteworthy; the interests of the *individual* constitute the starting point for the development of this system of ethics. There is abundant evidence of interest in petty concerns; the very large number of new double compound terms evinces, if not a desire for exact expression or of restoring to words the force they have lost, a fondness for pompous and picturesque effects, a tendency toward elaboration and an attention to detail, just as characteristic of decadent literature as of the arts. Another group deserving attention is that of "strengthened" terms; these words, while showing that tendency toward exaggeration characteristic of language in its decline, are a mockery of an age that we know was characterized by feeble feelings, lesser impulses, minor ambitions,—of which the numerous late diminutives are a truer expression. This large body of words gives a picture of a society, "hastening to explain everything in its decline", but at the same time aspiring to lofty virtues.

We are at first surprised that Plutarch seems to have borrowed so little from the Latin ethical vocabulary, but, as is well known, his "Demosthenes" begins with an apology for his slight knowledge of Latin. Apart from public life, Latin was never so widely learned in Greece as Greek was in the Roman world, all the time from the Scipios to Marcus Aurelius. (Cic. Arch. 23. Senec. Consol. ad Helv. 6.8. Juv. 15.110. Quint. i. 1.12. Suet. Claud. 42. Plut. i.564E.)

7. Mahaffy. c.12. "The Greek World Under Roman Sway."
8. Wedgwood. p. 129.

that infallible formula of a people, the Greek temperament was undergoing a subtle transformation, knowledge of which ought to correct the only too often preferred charges of "stagnancy" and a "contemptible decadence", made against the Greek of the first century. While it is true that Plutarch "rehabilitates the *ancient* sanctions of morality and of religion"[9], at the same time, unconsciously, perhaps, he becomes the high priest of a *new* moral aspiration.

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9. Wenley. "Plutarch and His Age". p. 267.

DISCUSSION.

Καινολογία.

The keen versatility and vivacity of the Greek mind naturally took delight in new language formations; this neologistic tendency was as ancient as Homer[1], and was very marked throughout the entire history of the people, as we see, for example, in Aeschylus, Aristophanes, the rhetoricians[2], Thucydides[3], Demosthenes, Polybius and Plutarch. The mental activity of the race, thus, in time, produced a vocabulary of extraordinary variety, to which free fancy contributed, as much as need.

When Polybius[4] uses the term καινολογία, (not occurring in Greek literature before his time), we are left in doubt whether he has coined a new term or is employing (as was possible for one who was writing in the "common dialect" and employing a less pure vocabulary), a word, current before his day but which had not yet crept into formal literature; this problem is of less consequence to us however, than the problems suggested by the use of the word in Polybius and in later writers. Polybius attributes καινολογία to Greek ambassadors, whose "strange phraseology" vexed the Roman senate; the latter fact is significant, as the more conservative[5] Romans would not, unnaturally, be vexed at Athenian volubility.

1. Eustathius, 1801, 27, calls Homer a καινολόγος δέ τις ποιητής.

2. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, (De Lys. p. 458) speaking of Greek literary styles, of the use of figures, of hyperboles, of καινολογία says δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος. cf. also Soph. Tr. 873.

3. Thucydides, 3.38, bears witness to the Athenian fondness for new phrases and novelty in language.

4. 38. 1. 1.

5. Hor. A. P. 45 seq. The Horatian dictum is not irreconcilable with Plautine, Lucretian and Ciceronian usage.

In Strabo[6] we find a similar admission that man (i. e. a Greek) in general, and children, in particular, were fond of the strange and the new[7]; a recommendation of myths follows, as being καινολογία τίς, on the ground that the element of novelty is an incentive to learning and provokes the desire to learn. The apologetic use of the new term suggests that it does not belong to the pure Greek vocabulary and thus, perhaps, throws light on the problem, raised, above, in Polybius.

The word, καινολογία, which we find, first, in Polybius, also occurs in Plutarch[8] and in Herodianus[9]. For the student of the new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, the changed attitude of the great moralist toward neologizing, in general, is most important; his derision of the practice of the Greek Stoics who go to extreme lengths and are excessively given to καινολογία, for its own sake, is evidence of his own conservatism and is positive proof that the numerous ethical terms that will be our particular study, were neither coined nor employed by him without a serious motive. We can rest assured, in all our subsequent work, that words were, with him, *vital.*

Εὑρεσιλογία.

That the term εὑρεσιλογία stands for a certain activity, contemporary with the life of the word itself, cannot be doubted. The term means loquacity, skill in finding words, command of words, quibbling, sophistical use of words, multiplying or inventing words, and is used of an idle use of words, as opposed to efficient labor or sincere search for truth. The idea is one, closely associately with καινολογία, discussed above, and a similar impulse must have created them both.

A consideration of the Greek attitude toward εὑρεσιλογία and the mental processes involved, is of prime importance,—

6. i. 2.8.

7. In the same passage, Strabo employs another new term, φιλειδήμων.

8. ii. 1068 D. Plutarch's conservatism is a matter of much importance in this connection.

9. Epim. p. 3.

is, in fact, a necessary preliminary, for the student of the new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, as it gives a preliminary knowledge of the ethical standard of the people who coined the new vocabulary, and assists us to a proper interpretation of the terms themselves.

The character and the extent of the *activity* defined by εὑρεσιλογία, are the two points of particular importance, for which the passages, in which the term occurs, furnish evidence.

Polybius'[1] use of the word indicates that to his mind it meant idle argument, mere loquacity. Philo[2] associates it with γλισχρολογία (itself a new term), uses it of quibbling of the Stoics, of research and of defence turned to bad account, and of idle prosecution, so that εὑρεσιλογία, not necessarily bad in itself, becomes so by implication. Diodorus[3] says Alexander καθόλου δὲ τοὺς ταῖς εὑρησιλγίαις κατασοφιζομένους τὴν δύναμιν τῆς πεπρωμένης ἐβλασφήμει. Diodorus does not always, however, use the term with reproach. Cornutus[4] opposes Herakles to ὁ εὑρεσιλόγος and it is obvious that the latter was a factor in the writer's own experience. Strabo[5] says οἱ γραμματικοὶ μυθάρια παραβάλλοντες εὑρεσιλογοῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ λύουσι τὰ ζητούμενα . . . . Arrian[6] is opposed to unprincipled, clever εὑρεσίλογοι. Eusebius[7] and Clemens[8] Alexandrinus view the activity with disfavor and discourage the spread of the evil. Sextus Empiricus[9] accuses the Dogmatists of εὑρεσιλογία. Diogenes Laertius[10], with this term, characterizes the philosophers Menedemus, Arcesilaus and Stilpo,—not necessarily with any evil association. Athenaeus[11] quotes (not, perhaps, exactly) Polybius, and expresses little regard for the quality. In the Oracula Sibyllina[12], οἱ εὑρεσίλογοι are included in a category

1. Polybius. 18. 29.3.
2. Philo. i. 698.45; ii. 492.16; i. 628.50; i. 314.29; ii. 49.24.
3. Diod. 17. 116.4. i. 37.9.
4. Cornut. 191.
5. Strabo. 13. i. 69, 17. i. 34.
6. Arr. Epict. 2.20. 35.
7. Eus. ii. 89. B.
8. Clem. Al. ii. 561. A.
9. Sext. Emp. i. 63.
10. Diog. L. ii. 134; iv. 37; ii. 113.
11. Ath. 193 D.
12. Or. Sib. i. 178.

of the worst criminals. Suidas[13] defines the term with the help of φλύαρος and ἑτοιμολόγος. Finally, Plutarch[14], earlier than the last and later than the first authors, quoted, occupies, too, a mean position in his understanding and application of the word and in the consequent feeling he entertained toward such to whom the word applied; in other words, he accuses the Stoics of εὑρεσιλογία, associates εὑρεσιλογία with παιδιά and opposes it to work worthy of the greatest zeal, but he also employs it, once, without any evil signification whatever, of a party of his guests who have engaged in clever argument and word play.

It is clear, therefore, that εὑρεσιλογία is an expression of a tendency, not, perhaps, new[15] in Greek life, but sufficiently strong from the time of Polybius on, to result in the coinage of the new term under consideration. It has been shown that the habit had a bad aspect which seemed to prevail over the less harmful, in consequence of which, the εὑρεσιλόγος, in life, was rather the quibbler and the sophist than the eloquent, earnest searcher for truth. By the time of Plutarch, the meaning of the word was crystallized; its signification in the "Moralia" is suggested in the literature before his day, as it is confirmed in the later literature.

As in the case of καινολογία, so Plutarch's attitude toward the activity expressed by εὑρεσιλογία, also, is clearly defined, and his *serious* employment of the more strictly ethical terms receives illumination therefrom.

Ταπεινός.

Before considering the significance of ταπεινοφροσύνη, it seems desirable to trace out, however incompletely, the historical development of the meaning of ταπεινός, in Greek lit-

13. Suid. Fr. Gr. 68.

14. Plut. ii. 625 C.; ii. 656 A–B; ii. 28 A; ii. 31. E; ii. 1033 B; ii. 1070 F; ii. 1072 F; ii. 414 A.

15. The idea that the word expresses, existed at least as early as the time of Pindar (0.9.120. εὑρησιεπής). If events of the early democracy could and did create this specific notion, we are not surprised to find a recurrence of that process of thought in the Graeco-Roman period, succeeding upon the wisdom of the Alexandrian age.

erature and life. With this in view, we have made a study of ταπεινός in Aeschylus[1], Euripides, Demosthenes, Aristotle (Eth. & Pol.), and Plutarch (Moralia). A knowledge of the reception accorded "humility"[2] at an earlier time is of great importance for the student of Plutarchean ethics.

We find, first, in the early period, evidences of a bold spirit to which humility was alien; second, at a later time, evidence of a negative and halting recognition of humility, at a time when we would expect suffering to bring out the trait, if it were in the national character; third, evidence of a greater leniency, in the century of Athens' supreme conflict, coupled, however, in the same age, with a philosphical system that grew out of an atmosphere in which humility could hardly thrive and be recognized as a virtue; and fourth, lastly, an attitude in which new tendencies, more generous and more cosmopolitan, appear, but in which the old standards, though withdrawing into the background, do not vanish!

In Aeschylus[3], ταπεινός is used of a lowering in rank, at one time, of Prometheus, whom Oceanus counsels, urging submission to a resistless power, (the course is not dishonorable, but, nevertheless, for Prometheus an unendurable humiliation),—at another, of Zeus; this time the condition is one to which his archenemy would reduce him (with the commentary of δουλεύειν). The state, characterized by ταπεινός, provokes scorn and contempt. Without any suggestion of evil or wickedness, the state is quite intolerable, merely because it is low; humility is slavery and no free-born Greek admires it.

In Euripides, we find a deeper interpretation and a wider application of the term; it signifies, first, as before, humiliation; but also, second, submissive humility; and, third, wickedness and depravity. Certain passages[4] reflect the old inherent tendency in the Greek character to respect strength,

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1. ταπεινός does not seem to occur in Homer nor in Sophocles.
2. We reserve, for the future, the study of such words and phrases as χαμαίζηλον, βαιός, ταπείνωσις, ταπεινότης, σμικρὸν φρονεῖν, μετρίως φρονεῖν.
3. Aes. Pr. 320, 908, 926.
4. Eur. Fr. xxii. 2; iii. 2; xxx. 4.

success and wealth, with little charity for their opposites. In the second place[5], ταπεινός is predicated of Andromache, of Orestes, of Herakles, and we find a new suggestion, not openly expressed but clearly implied, of leniency toward submission and humility; but the circumstances are of the most trying nature and these alone render humility excusable. Submission or humility does not necessarily entail loss of honor or self-respect. It does not, regardless of causes, awaken a strong revulsion of feeling. In the third place[6], the word is used of Odysseus, of Orestes and of Pylades, of Agamemnon, and of Helen and falls from hostile lips; it signifies baseness, cowardice, disgrace, and is a term of strong condemnation. The treatment of the word shows a development of the idea, a growth and quickening of the moral consciousness.

The three distinct senses of the word that we have observed, are still more clearly marked in Demosthenes; the tendencies we have noticed before are more sharply defined. Demosthenes uses the word first[7], of Philip, of the Athenian army, of Thebes—with the old implications of weakness, of humiliation, insignificance, lack of pride, and always with an association of scorn and contempt. The term is, however, also used in a milder sense[8]; it is used of Athens, in her final struggles, in her helplessness, with deep reproach to be sure and with a suggestion of loss of prestige and earlier reputation and of pride, but still with no loss of honor. That it was possible to associate and even identify the idea with μέτριος is an indication of a movement toward greater leniency, on the part of the Athenian public,—the common people to whom Demosthenes made his pleas, and in whom humility inspired pity. In the third place[9], that other sense of positive evil has become thoroughly established.

In Aristotle, we see the earlier meaning more clearly. The tone of Demosthenes is mild, that of Aristotle reminds us of the past; the former is decidedly a man of his age; the

5. Eur. Andr. 165. 971. Her. F. 1406. (cf. Xen. Cyr. 5.1.5.)
6. Eur. Hec. 245. Orest. 1411. Iph. A. 339. Troad. 1018. Fr. ii. 1.
7. Dem. i. 9; 4.23; 9.21; 16.24; 19.325; 61.25.
8. Dem. 8.67; 1074; 13.25; 21. 183-6; 45.4; 57.45.
9. Dem. 18. 108; 18. 178.

latter has inherited more of the earlier temper; the former speaks the note of the struggling democracy, the latter, the eulogy of the once proud state. We have, here, indications of the old pride, of scorn for weakness, together with a careful effort to attain moderation in all matters; hence the ταπεινοί were certain to meet with censure in Aristotle, as the word meant, to him, a failure to attain that mean, whether the word had a social, moral or political application. This is an aristocratic society the exercise of whose virtues requires wealth and leisure and noble birth. The ταπεινός[10] is humble, cannot be liberal, is easily a flatterer, and is servile; for him Aristotle can have no words except of condemnation. This probably represents the essentially Greek attitude and ὁ ταπεινός incurs the strong displeasure of the Greek, less because he may be base or wicked than because he is low. Σωφροσύνη is the mean opposed to ὕβρις, and not ταπεινότης! Here, most clearly, we see the slight recognition of humility, the absence of mercy toward the lowly, the assertion of an old confidence within conscious, artistic limits.

We find the three significations we have noticed before, still more clearly defined in Plutarch. He could say: ἐχθροῦ δὲ . . τὸ τιμωρίαν παραλιπεῖν καιροῦ παρασχόντος ἐπιεικές ἐστι (90 F), εὐγένεια καλὸν μέν, ἀλλὰ προγόνων ἀγαθόν (5 D), and ἐγὼ γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν βουλοίμην πᾶσι κοινῇ χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀγωγήν (8 E). This is evidenee of a greater equalization of classes, of a breaking down of old distinctions. Thus we find, in the matter of ταπεινός, first, a recognition, to be sure, of the old feeling which does not disappear,—but second, at the same time, a greater forgiveness, extended to the humble and the lowly who cannot be accused of evil, and,—third, finally, a certain indulgence, even in the case of evil that ταπεινός may suggest. The Greek of this late period has not entirely lost the distinctive traits of his ancestors; humility[11], submission, sub-

10. Arist. Hδ8. 1124^{b}22; Hδ8. 1125^{a}2; n. e. γ. 3. 1231^{b}12; n. e. γ. 6. 1233^{b}13; n. e. n. 11. 1244^{a}6; αρ 7. 1251^{b}15, 25; π. γ. 13. 1284^{a}41; π. δ. 11. 1295^{b}18; π. e. 11. 1313^{b}41; π. e. 11. 1315^{b}6′; π. θ. 2. 1337^{b}14.

11. Plut. ii. 91 C; ii. 111 F; ii. 266 D; ii. 276 D; ii. 584 E; ii. 762 E; ii. 805 D; ii. 807 E; ii. 822 D; ii. 1046 C; ii. 1060 A.

ordination,—without, in any sense, being connected with evil,—still were likely to provoke his scorn and even his indignation. At the same time, in spite of this apparent pride, events of several hundred years have greatly modified his character, and, with it, his attitude in this matter. The former note is a protest, an old strain that *will* assert itself; but, with this, there appears[12] a more generous inclination toward the humble and the lowly, whether thus through the accident of birth, through sorrow, or through sin.

But the pagan Greek position could never, probably, be that which we find in the Scriptures[13], where this word is used of the noblest and the most necessary of all the virtues. There it conveys a sense of honor unknown to the Greek, but suited to the Hebraic and to the Christian world[14]. Such a conception was foreign to the Greek nature; if suggestions of such a feeling appear, at times, as in Plato[15], and, later, more frequently, in Plutarch, it means that, within Greek limitations, an *evolution was taking place in philanthropy, which, though more merciful than ever before, nevertheless still remained pagan*[16].

Ταπεινοφροσύνη.

The word ταπεινόφρων, while occurring in the Septuagint, does not recur, again, until Plutarch's time, and becomes common, only later, in the Patristic literature.

The feeling, of which it is an expression, is a fundamental one which would effect all thought, feeling and conduct. In the Septuagint on the one hand, and in the New Testament and in a large body of Patristic literature on the other, the virtue of ταπεινοφροσύνη is accepted without reservation; it is constantly encouraged and recommended with other virtues; nor is it merely an ideal that provokes exhortation, but often, by implication, and frequently, expressly, is acknowledged a fact in Greek life. "Humility" then, was

12. Plut. 11. 357 A; ii. 599 B; ii. 806 A; ii. 822 D; ii. 1069 C.
13. N. T. Math. 11.29; Luc. 14.11; Peter i. 5.5; LXX. Pr. 1619.
14. See discussion of ταπεινοφροσύνη.
15. Plato. Legg. iv. 716 A (cf. Origen. i. 1312 C.)
16. Plutarch favored slavery and was an aristocrat.

a factor in the evolution of Greek character[1], as early as the time of the Septuagint[2, 3] and as late as the fourth century after Christ, and was operating in Greek communities in Asia Minor and Alexandria in the East, and in Rome, in the West.

While it is impossible to determine to what extent such suggestions were immediately operative, the fact remains that the suggestion was there, and, certainly, later, bore fruit. Ignatius[4], writing to the Ephesians, exhorts them to be ταπεινόφρονες; he contrasts that frame of mind with μεγαλορρημοσύνη and unites it with πραότης. Barnabas[5] feels it to be a man's duty to obey the Lord's commands, not to exalt one's self but to be ταπεινόφρων. In the Doctrina Orientalis[6], the Lord is praised for his great ταπεινοφροσύνη. Peter[7] urges all men to be compassionate and humble-minded. Paul[8] urges the Ephesians and the Philippians to follow his example of serving the Lord with all humility, meekness and long-suffering. In Basilius[9] we find the dictum that he is great in the sight of the Lord who has yielded ταπεινοφρόνως to his neighbor. Tertullian[10] preaches great ταπεινοφροσύνη, with endurance of hunger, thirst and imprisonment. Origen[11], blames Celsus for his misconception of ταπεινοφροσύνη and even finds encouragement of the virtue in Plato. His own defence of the quality is unequivocal. Hippolytus[12] cites the case of Nabouchodonosor, who regained his king-

1. Ταπεινότης, the earlier term, has not the significance of noble humility we find associated with ταπεινοφροσύνη. In a moral sense, it implies baseness,—as, in Plat. Pol. 309 A., joined with ἀμαθία, in Arist. Rhet. ii. 6. 1384, synonymous with μικροψυχία, and in Dem. 151.9 united with ἀδοξία.
2. LXX. Ps. 131. 2.
3. LXX. Prov. 29.23.
4. Ignat. X. 64 (653 A.)
5. Barn. 777 B.
6. Doctr. Or. 656 A.
7. N. T. Petr. 1.3.8.
8. N. T. Act. 20.19; Ep. Eph. 4.2. (Also, Ep. Phil. 2.3.)
9. Basil. iv. 813 A.
10. Tertull. ii. 970 A.
11. Origen. i. 1312 D; vii. 217 B; i. 1312 C.
12. Hippol. 681 A; 856 B.

dom through ταπεινοφροσύνη, and quotes the Evangelist John as authority for the Lord's ταπεινοφροσύνη. Hermas[13] promises God's pity to those who repent and become humble. Clemens[14] Romanus exhorts all to live in concord and sanctity, to avoid pride and arrogance, and to be examples to others of ταπεινοφροσύνη, which servants of the Lord practice.

Between the two temporal extremes, considered above, we find the term employed in Plutarch, in Arrian and in Josephus, and the distinctly different feeling entertained toward the quality is very significant. While there is no question of the unreserved welcome, extended the virtue in these two extreme periods, and, too, no question of its actual practice, we find a different ethical standard, a tentative reserve, expressed in the middle period.

Neither in Plutarch, nor in Josephus, nor in Arrian has the word the same connotation of meaning we have found in the passages quoted above, and, in consequence, we find a different attitude toward the ταπεινόφρονες. Plutarch[15] with all his generosity, feels a reserve toward this virtue, which to his mind implies, at least, a loss of noble spirit and thus approaches dangerously near baseness. Josephus[16] relates how the Roman Galba, accused, by the soldiers, of ταπεινοφροσύνη, was treacherously put to death. Such "weak-mindedness", approaching "meanness" or "cowardice", was associated by Arrian[17] with the vice of κολακεία.

Thus, while in the first century A. D., Greek Ethics did not, as yet, welcome the idea of humility, still the idea was a present force that was at work in the Greek consciousness and, in time, produced great psychic changes. Although the idea did not receive complete acceptance in Plutarch's day, yet it was not ostracized, and the Greek mind gradually became accustomed to it,—more so, even in the first century A. D., than the above study would seem to indicate. The

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13. Herm. Sim. 7; Vis. 3.10.
14. Clem. R. i.2; i.19; i.30; i.44 (cf. also Or. Sib. 8.481) i.48 (cf. also Cl. Al. i.532 B).
15. Plut. ii. 336 E; ii. 475 E.
16. Jos. B. J. 4.9.2.
17. Arr. Epict. i.9.10; 3.24.56.

presence of other virtues, such as ἀνεξικακία, μετριοπάθεια and ἀγαθοποιΐα, closely related to "humility", demonstrates this! Still it is difficult to resist the conclusion that *the Greek temper was still essentially proud*[18].

As the prejudice, however, against "humility" broke down, there was wide room for sympathy, equality and kindness. At the same time that ἀγαθοποιΐα, ἀνεξικακία and μετριοπάθεια flourish, (forces that would help to break down that prejudice and to create the necessary environment for "humility") real strength, including audacity, courage and μεγαλοεργία, gradually vanishes, and *an epoch of weakness is ushered in, also fostering a constantly growing humility*[19]; for these virtues inevitably acted and reacted upon one another[20].

Μετριοπάθεια.

The previous study of ταπεινός and of ταπεινοφροσύνη has led us to believe that the Greek character of Plutarch's day was, still, proud and essentially pagan; that is, despite a certain great philanthropy, humility was not yet welcomed, without reserve. It was, nevertheless, an existing force that could not be overlooked, whose influence is further traceable in other virtues, as that of μετριοπάθεια.

While μετριοπάθεια, in its form at least, truthfully reflects the spirit of the past[1], expressing that artistic proportion[2] that was consciously sought in the sphere of the feelings as in everything else, yet that very artistic and hence exclusive spirit, of which we have a reminiscence in the form of this word, yielded to other, humanizing influences, of which

18. See also discussion of ταπεινός.

19. We are not surprised, therefore, to find other ideas, besides the one of "thinking", viz. of "saying" and of "doing", united, in time, with the adjective ταπεινο-, and forming new compounds.

20. See discussion of μετριοπάθεια.

1. Plutarch constantly betrays the old Greek search for moderation; this essentially Greek strain still survives in his century. ἔντεχνον δέ τὸ τήν μέσην ἐν ἅπασι τέμνειν ἐμμελές τε. Plut. ii. 7 B.

2. Of which μετριότης and σωφροσύνη, the ruling principle of Greek life, are further expressions.

ταπεινοφροσύνη was one. Under such influences, μετριοπάθεια acquired a meaning in Plutarch, it never could have possessed in Aristotle.

We find the term employed from the time of Aristeas to that of Sextus Empiricus, and its significance is not the same throughout. There are certainly no aesthetic implications involved in the word, as applied to the Romans or to the Hebrews; the control of the feelings, in these instances, was referable, rather, to another sense,—that of duty and of honor. The weakness, involved in Plutarch's μετριοπάθεια, (Plutarch was not conscious of that weakness however) is felt, also, in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in St. Paul, in Philo, but no trace of it appears in Appian or in Sextus Empiricus.

In Sextus Empiricus[3] we find the position of the Skeptic defined, whose τέλος, in life, is ἀπάθεια in matters of opinion, and μετριοπάθεια in matters of necessity. As far as the Skeptic felt that the ἀταραξία of ἀπάθεια and that ἐποχή could secure him the greatest happiness, his life would be a practice of his ideal, and, to that extent, at least, μετριοπάθεια was a factor in Greek life for several hundred years. Appian[4] represents Pyrrhus of Epirus as possessing μετριοπάθεια, for sparing the conquered Romans and giving them peace. The Numantini prayed Scipio for indulgence and μετριοπάθεια. There is none of the suggestion of weakness, here, that we shall find in Philo; as predicated of the Romans, united with σωφρόνισμα, associated with εὐσέβεια, identified with μέγαλοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια means that heroic forbearance which had exalted the Roman race.[5]

Plutarch[6] attributes this virtue to Camillus, Metellus, Aristeides, Socrates and Stilpo; his recognition of the contemporary practice of the virtue is coupled with an exhortation for its wider employment. His association of μετριοπάθεια with πραότης is, perhaps, significant. The terminology of

3. Sext. Emp. 8.18; 176.21; 176.23; 577.13; 9.20.
4. App. i.366.63; i.408.32; i.420.18; i.62.70; i.218.90; i.366.52.
5. Verg. Aen. 6.851-3.
6. Plut. ii. 102 D; ii. 1119 C; ii.458 C; ii.489 C; ii.551 C.

Aristotle[7] is, in this connection, very important; we find the following scale: ὑπερβολή=ὀργιλότης; μεσότης=πραότης; ἔλλειψις=ἀοργησία. Aristotle says that πραότης is really not the word to express the mean, as its suggests weakness and inclines to the defect of ἀοργησία, or utter absence of anger or entire lack of spirit. Plutarch makes no such apology for πραότης, nor for μετριοπάθεια! While Plutarch's μετριοπάθεια must have seemed to Aristotle as little, or perhaps even less a perfect virtue than his own πραότης, for Plutarch, the word and the virtue carried no similar reproach. The weakness of μετριοπάθεια did not strike him. It is plain that the ethical standard has shifted. There is a wide gap between Aristotelian and Plutarchean ethics. In Plutarch, the feeling for a "mean", for a control of the passions looking to an observation of the "mean", for the sake of the "mean", is not so strong as a control prompted by unselfish, altruistic motives. With such a different standard, the limits within which μετριοπάθεια could exercise itself, were, also, certain to change.

Josephus[8], like Appian, credits Romans with the possession of μετριοπάθεια and it is mentioned with μεγαλοφροσύνη. Paul's[9] high priest is able to μετριοπαθεῖν, ... ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς περίκειται, ἀσθένειαν. Philo[10] includes μετριοπάθεια, attributed to Aaron, Abraham and Joseph, among the virtues making for a noble character, in spite of the fact that he represents Moses, the perfect man, as turning his back upon μετριοπάθεια and cultivating ἀπάθεια instead; μετριοπάθεια, to the Hebraic mind, seemed rather a concession to human frailty. Dionysius of Halicarnassus[11] opposes μετριοπάθεια and a number of allied virtues, which do not go to make up a very strong character,—opposes these to the qualities of πικρός and χαλεπός, found in the nature of the Volsci. Aristeas[12] mentions μετριοπάθεια, as part of the equipment of a philosopher.

In Diogenes Laertius[13] we find: ἔφη δὲ τὸν σοφὸν μὴ εἶναι μὲν

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7. Arist. Eth. N. 4.5.1 seq; Eth. N. 2.7.10; η.μ.a.23.1191b25. Cf. also discussion of ἀνεξικακία.
8. Jos. A. J. 12.3.2.
9. N. T. Ep. Hebr. 5.2.
10. Philo. i.113.44; ii.37.26; ii.45.38; ii.315.41; ii.439.2: i.113.31; i.113.2.
11. Dion. H. 8. 61.
12. Aristeas. 29.
13. Diog. L. 5.31.

ἀπαθῆ, μετριοπαθῆ δέ. If Aristotle is quoted exactly, the word is an old one, of the Peripatetic school. If an old word, it is singular that we do not find it in Aristotle[14],—aye, even frequently.

While the idea of μετριοπάθεια was, doubtless, rooted in the Greek consciousness long before Plutarch's day, just as it existed there, long afterwards, the word changed in meaning from the time of Aristeas to that of Sextus Empiricus. Most important for us is the fact that *weakness is clearly and commonly conceived as an element in* μετριοπάθεια, *in the first century A. D.* The word becomes a witness both for old forces and for new, a concession to the old idea of aesthetic repose and a confession of the new moral standard, testimony of *an age that was externally influenced by the past but which was vitally affected by the present.* The original aristocratic nature of μετριοπάθεια, was approaching the standard of the contemporary ταπεινοφροσύνη, which at once influenced the evolution and encouraged the practice of the former virtue.

With the Plutarchean conception of μετριοπάθεια, the Greek mind was ready to entertain other virtues, as ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιΐα and κοινωφέλεια.

Ἀνεξικακία.

While "humility", because involving a sacrifice of pride, received only a reserved welcome from Plutarch, it doubtless affected the development of μετριοπάθεια, which, in the first century A. D., possessed a large degree of feebleness. Plutarch's naive ignorance of this fact made his own reception of this virtue the more possible. But no prejudice existed against the inherent weakness of ἀνεξικακία, which was accepted without hesitation by Plutarch. This paradox is not entirely inexplicable; the relation of ἀνεξικακία to μετριοπάθεια is suggested by Plutarch, in the De Fraterno Amore, thus: μετριοπαθείας ἔκγονον ἀνεξικακίαν[1]; to the older virtue, naturally, there clung associations of the past, but no similar

14. Aristotle was familiar with μετριότης, but μετριο- compounds are, in the main, of late origin.

1. Plut. ii. 489 C.

mystery attached to the later word. Plutarch's failure to recognize the changed character of μετριοπάθεια was as natural, as was his willingness to adopt ἀνεξικακία (a comparatively new sentiment), although it brought in its train implications that meant a break with the past and its traditions.

The life of the word was very long; we find the term, first, in the Septuagint, then in the literature of the first century A. D. and shortly before, and, finally, as late as Porphyrogenitus. A study of the literature in which the word occurs reveals the character and vitality of the virtue.

Of the pagan attitude toward ἀνεξικακία we can form some idea from the testimony of several writers, flourishing immediately before and soon after Plutarch, and we get, too, suggestions of the practice of the virtue. Cicero's[2] meditation upon ἀνεξία for a whole year was hardly without results, any more than Paul's[3] exhortations to Timothy that δοῦλον δὲ κυρίου . . . δεῖ . . . εἶναι πρὸς πάντας . . . ἀνεξίκακον. The virtue was well known to Epictetus[4], who preaches of its valuable results, πραότης and ἀοργησία. Lucian's[5] approval of ἀνεξικακία is not altogether certain, but Herodianus[6] tones down a rather harsh picture of Severus, by attributing ἀνεξικακία and καρτερία to him. The term occurs in Pollux[7]. Diogenes Laertius[8], with admiration, describing Socrates' endurance of ridicule, says καί πάντα ταῦτα φέρειν ἀνεξικάκως. Themistius[9] defines the ἀνεξικακία of Sthenelus, by opposing to him—τὸν δὲ οὐ στέγοντα ὕβριν; no comment follows.

Thus after Cicero, we find in Greek literature, outside of Plutarch, a decided appreciation of the virtue of ἀνεξικακία and signs that the virtue was cultivated. Its scope is not so clearly defined as in Plutarch, though it implies, at least, an

2. Cic. Att. 5.11.
3. N. T. Tim. ii. 2.24.
4. Epict. Ench. 10. Arr. Epict. 3.20.9.
5. Lucian: Judic. Voc. 9; Asin. 2; De. Par. 53.
6. Hdn. 3.8.
7. Poll. 5.138.
8. Diog. L. 221.
9. Themist. 271 B.

endurance of abuse, a considerable humility and control of anger[10].

The extent of Plutarch's "forbearance" was remarkable, —overcoming τιμωρία, leading to acts of charity toward the feeble and even toward a foe, bringing about extreme mildness toward erring servants, and inducing the cultivation of ἀοργησία, φιλανθωπία, and freedom from harsh words and deeds[11]. Plutarch speaks from personal experience, of the value of ἀνεξικακία whose present or existing force he recognizes, while exhorting still others to practice the virtue. Plutarch, as he had done in the case of μετριοπάθεια, constantly associates ἀνεξικακία with πραότης; in spite of his consciousness of its meekness, he takes refuge in the association of ἀνεξικακία with ἀνδρεία and with μεγαλοψυχία, on the hypothesis that weakness may be strength. Plutarch's broad interpretation of ἀνεξικακία may, perhaps, have been far in advance of the average conception of the virtue,—but even this implies an actual exercise of ἀνεξικακία in the pagan world, though its scope may generally have been more limited.

From the Septuagint[12] with its approval of ἀνεξικακία and ἐπιείκεια to Porphyrogenitus[13] who bears witness to the inclusion of this virtue in the body of Christian ideals, we have, in Ecclesiastic Greek, an important line of evidence touching the feeling entertained toward ἀνεξικακία by a large community of Greek speaking people, distributed over the entire pagan world. In Justin Martyr[14], ἀνεξικακία is not only strongly approved, but partially defined by reference to exhortations of Christ[15] and by association with ἀοργησία and ὑπομονή. Clementin[16] refers to an incident of self-control in Peter's life and the

10. While we find such older terms as ἐγκράτεια, καρτερία, ἀοργησία, μειλιχία, etc., in the passages, cited above, yet ἀνεξικακία, as understood in the first century A. D. and afterwards, was a virtue that hardly fitted into the older pagan world, and the ἀνεξικακία of Epictetus could hardly have corresponded to the virtue of the Homeric Greek, which Themistius calls ἀνεξικακία.

11. Plut. ii. 90 E, 464 C, 489 C, i. 220 E, i. 290 F, ii. 459 C.

12. LXX. Sap. 2.19.

13. Porph. Cer. i.62. 16; 574.7.

14. Just. M. Apol. i.16.

15. N. T. Matth. 5. 39.40; Luc. 6.29.

16. Clementin. 448 A.

high approval of that conduct, described by means of μεγάλως and ἀνεξικάκως. Basilius[17] counts ἀνεξικακία as part of εὐσέβεια to be exercised toward all. Macarius'[18] advice to bear misfortune with ἀνεξικακία and μακροθυμία was to his mind no more impossible, than was the extraordinary conduct of Constantine which Eusebius[19] calls φιλανθρωπίας ὑπερβολή.

The evidence drawn from this source, covering a wide period of time and extending over a great reach of territory, demonstrates the unreserved practice of ἀνεξικακία on the part of those to whom Judaism and Christianity appealed. The practice of this virtue involved a degree of patience, of humility, of weakness and meekness, submission to misfortune, of philanthropy,—with complete suppression of pride, which only piety and religious zeal could have inspired.[20]

In the matter of "forbearance", then, Plutarch occupied a middle ground, between the position taken by most pagan Greeks of the first and second centuries A. D., on the one hand, and that of the Christians of the same period and later. If Plutarch was not ready to make concessions that seemed necessary and noble to Christians, he was, nevertheless, ahead of his age in generosity. The essential weakness of μετριοπάθεια reappears in its offspring virtue of ἀνεξικακία; but in the case of the latter virtue, Plutarch is more aware of that lack of strength than in the case of the former. Progressus in ἀνεξικακία was, significantly enough, accompanied by a development of ἀοργησία, which, a "defect" in Aristotle, is highly praised by Plutarch, though an amiable weakness. If able to embrace the virtue of ἀνεξικακία, as interpreted by Plutarch, the old Greek pride was broken, his character was tempered and humbled; it meant a new tolerance, which was sure to destroy the old idea of τιμωρία and to be of the utmost consequence to slaves. The inherent possibilities of the Plutarchean ἀνεξικακία appear, however, in their

17. Basil. iv. 460.B.

18. Macar. 233 D.

19. Eus. ii. 989 C.

20. We find in the passages (14-19) such older words as μακροθυμία, ἐπιείκεια, ἀοργησία, ὑπομονή, πραότης—all of which, whatever their history, eventually helped to make ἀνεξικακία possible.

bloom, only later, in the ecclesiastical literature. The possible effects of ἀνεξικακία were far-reaching. The record of the actual effects of ἀνεξικακία in Plutarch's day indicates the great circle of its activity, the numerous directions in which it was affecting Greek Ethics and Greek Life.

Ἀγαθοποιΐα.

While the weakness of μετριοπάθεια was veiled, no similar doubt existed about ἀνεξικακία. The presence of both these virtues was essential to the development of ἀγαθοποιΐα. The passive character of ἀνεξικακία is supplemented by the more positive or active nature of ἀγαθοποιΐα. The ultimate effect of the three virtues would, necessarily, be—first, the suppression of the pride that rendered ταπεινοφροσύνη in Plutarch's day, still foreign; second, the gradual naturalization of "humility".

The concept of which the word ἀγαθοποιΐα is an expression[1], existed in the Greek mind as far back as the time of the Septuagint; it does not appear with any frequency, however, until the first century A. D.; we find the word employed, in Plutarch, in the N. T., and, commonly, in Patristic Literature.

In the Septuagint[2], ἀγαθοποιΐα is predicated, primarily, of God, but also of man and, with certain qualifications, of woman besides. It is a divine quality, existing, potentially, in man, and also actually exhibited in acts of generosity and in filial piety.

Plutarch[3] says Osiris has been called ὁ ἀγαθοποιός. In the New Testament[4], we find the term frequently, and Christ is

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1. There were, to be sure, numerous words in the earlier language, signifying benefaction, kindness, good-will, as εὐεργεσία, εὔνοια, φίλανθρωπία, ὠφέλιμος, προσηνής, ἀγαθοεργία, φιλάγαθος, etc. But the great majority of ἀγαθο- compounds are late, and this, of itself, is, perhaps, a sign of a certain moral agitation. Besides, it is the *character* of ἀγαθοποιΐα that is of chief importance to this discussion.

2. LXX. Num. 10.32, Tobit. 12.13. Sophon. i.12. Macc. i.11.33, Sir. 42.14.

3. Plut. ii. 368 B.

4. N. T. Marc. 3.4; Luc. 6.33; Petr. i.2.15; i.4.19; i.3.6; i.3.17; Act. 14.17; Petr. i.2.20; Joann. 3.11. Epist.

represented as the chief inspiration of the ἀγαθοποιοί, who approach the Christ-like, by the exercise of this virtue. Practically no limits are set for the practice of the virtue, ἀγαθοποιΐα, whose benefits should be universal! In Artemidorus[5], Ptolemaeus[6] and Hermes[7], the word is used only in an astronomical sense of the stars and of the planets. Sextus Empiricus[8] gives clear expression to the religious tone of ἀγαθοποιΐα, in the following: ἀγαθοῦ ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν. τἀγαθὸν δὲ γε ὁ θεός. ἴδιον ἄρα ἐστὶ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν.

In the Ecclesiastical literature we receive confirmation of the suggestions that have appeared elsewhere. Clemens Romanus[9], in an epistle to the Corinthians, establishes the divine origin of ἀγαθοποιΐα and its cosmopolitan character; the degree of piety it involves is almost more than human. Athenagoras'[10] language could hardly be called equivocal: ὁ δὲ θεὸς τελείως ἀγαθὸς ὢν ἀϊδίως ἀγαθοποιός ἐστιν. Hermas[11] throws further light on the position of the ἀγαθοποιός in life, whose virtues include πίστις, ἀλήθεια, ὑπομονή, τὸ χήρας ὑπηρετεῖν and φιλοξενία. The "Testamenta Patriarcharum"[12] and Diognetus[13] simply re-affirm the position of Clemens Romanus, while Clemens Alexandrinus[14] defines the ἀγαθοποιΐα of the perfect man, who submerges his own interests in the greater benefits of all others. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paulus Alexandrinus[15] and Eusebius[16] use the term, also, in an astronomical sense, of the stars. Iamblichus'[17] statement is another predication of this virtue, of the gods.

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5. Artem. 4.59.
6. Ptol. Tetrab. 38, 19.48; Bibl. i.19.
7. Hermes Tr. Iatrom. 388.10.
8. Sext. Emp. M. ii. 70.
9. Clem. R. 2.10; i.2; i.344.
10. Athenag. 952A.
11. Hermas, Mand. 8; Vis. 3.9.
12. Patriarch. 1137 C.
13. Diognet. 1176 A.
14. Clem. Al. i. 1348 A. 692 C, (ii. 460A. θεός.)
15. Paul. Al. iv. init.
16. Eus. P. E. 275 D.
17. Iambl. 52.18.

The governing motive of ἀγαθοποιΐα is not far to seek; its *religious character* is very pronounced! The unrestricted limits within which we find the activity, implied in ἀγαθοποιΐα, exercised, is, also, most important, as it clearly indicates the *breadth of the sympathy* of the age that first brought the idea prominently forward in literature,—which means, in life. The sacrifice, necessary for ἀνεξικακία, grows apace with the development of ἀγαθοποιΐα; but that sacrifice was a possibility through the religious impulse back of it.

While the evidence drawn from Plutarch himself is slight, that obtained from other sources renders clearer to our minds the possible and the probable status of ἀγαθοποιΐα for Plutarch and his age. These side lights establish the same impression that our previous study of ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια and ἀνεξικακία has created. The four virtues are so closely involved that it is almost impossible to dissociate them; contemporaneous, in fact, they must have acted upon one another, withal that each had its own special functions. It is not impossible to conceive of ἀγαθοποιΐα[18] as the crown of them all, pledge and product of their sincerity.

Κοινωφελία[1] and Μεγαλωφελής.

Κοινωφελής and μεγαλωφελής are clearly closely related. We find both of the words, for the first time, in literature of the first century A. D. or shortly before. Each activity was, plainly, a possibility in the atmosphere, created by the earlier feelings implied by ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία and ἀγαθοποιΐα. The mood following upon the cultivation of such virtues was hardly averse to κοινωφελία and μεγαλωφελία. How far that mood expressed itself in action is a problem that a study of κοινωφελία and of μεγαλωφελία will in part, as least, clarify.

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18. It is, perhaps, singular that ἀγαθοποιΐα is of late origin, when we find ἀγαθοεργι'α in Herodotus, κακοποιός in Pindar, and κακουργί'α in Homer.

1. κοινωφελι'α is the form recognized by the "Etymologicum Magnum", 462.21, although κοινωφέλεια appears in Diodorus.

Plutarch's[2] definition of the "perfect" man is significant,—viz., one who has combined political power with the calm life of the philosopher, having thus gained the two greatest blessings, the peace of the philosopher's retirement and τοῦ . . . κοινωφελοῦς βίου of those engaged in political affairs. There is no suggestion in the essay that Plutarch had in mind the life only of a narrow πολιτεία and there can be little doubt but that his vision was much broader. There can be no question about the meaning of Philo's[3] phrase: κοινωφελεῖς γὰρ αἱ τοῦ πρώτου ἡγεμόνος δωρεαί. The same broad interpretation applies (1) to his statement of a dogma which he calls κοινωφελέστατον, ὅτι πᾶς δημιουργὸς ἡδονῆς σοφίας ἐστὶν ἄγονος, and (2) to his characterization of Joseph's upright statesmanship and judgment as κοινωφελεῖς. Perhaps one could hardly speak dogmatically of the true meaning of κοινωφελής, as applied by Plutarch to Antigonus, successor of Alexander. Diodorus Siculus[4] clearly limits the possible κοινωφέλεια of great monuments, to the inhabitants of Egypt. Marcus Aurelius[5] counts among his other virtues of mildness, of perseverance, of freedom from vain conceit, of love of toil,—also, willingness to pay heed to those who were able to produce τί κοινωφελές; for him, this is of world-wide import. Galen[6] speaks of medical services of "common utility" to a Cretan city. Clemens Romanus[7] attributes to the Lord ζητεῖν τὸ κοινωφελὲς πᾶσιν, which is in proportion to his "humility".

At first blush we would incline to a belief in a growth of *wide philanthropy*, previously fostered by such sentiments as ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία and ἀγαθοποιΐα, and expressed by κοινωφελία. Whether the wide philanthropy of κοινωφελία was largely a fancy or real fact of extended application is partially determined by the passages in which this word occurs. The idea, strong enough to seek embodiment in a new term, was actually *vital* enough to serve as a factor in life,—well known to Galen and to Marcus Aurelius and

2. Plut. i. 258 E; ii. 8 A.
3. Philo. i.389.28; ii.52.19; ii.404; ii.376.
4. Diod. i.51.
5. Anton. i.16.
6. Galen. 14.296.
7. Clem. R. i.48.

clearly implied by Philo, Diodorus and Plutarch! The word expresses not merely a passive sense of equality, a widening humanity, but also an active interest in affairs.

While such sentiments are, necessarily, always, to some extent *ideal*, yet the consideration and contemplation and welcoming of that ideal, in time, at least in part, establishes that ideal more and more a dynamic working force in actual life. The operative power of such a δύναμις may or may not be able to create its own perfect ἐντελέχεια, but the fact of the δύναμις none would deny.

The fact of weakness, pre-supposed by the other virtues of μετριοπάθεια and ἀνεξικακία, would operate against the complete success of κοινωφελία and we find little to justify the belief in a vigorous activity looking toward a universal amelioration.[8]

While still, then, to a degree, ideal (perhaps the Greek temperament could never realize such an ideal)—κοινωφελία was, nevertheless, not an impossibility to the imagination of the first century A. D.! The Macedonian conquest had broken down the barriers between Greek and barbarian; the Stoic philosophy had proclaimed the equality of all men; the Roman conquest[8] had still further reduced the Greek people. Under these circumstances, the *cosmopolitan* and *religious* character of κοινωφελία (as of ἀγαθοποιΐα) is a matter of little surprise. The broad political values of Plutarch and the religious of Philo are both of *universal* application to all mankind[9]!

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8. See "Historical Introduction."

9. Κοινωφελής was formed, perhaps, after analogy of the older δημωφελής. While κοινωνία and εὐεργέτης are earlier terms, κοινο-ποιέω, -πραγία and -παθής are of comparatively late origin.

Μεγαλωφελής.—What has been said of κοινωφελής is largely true of this word, also, and little need be added.

Μεγαλωφελία was at least a possibility (as has been said of κοινωφελία), though the passages in which this word occurs give but a negative result.

The passages, Plut. ii. 553 D; Cleomed. i.15; Clem. A. i.352 B., do not demonstrate the actuality of the virtue that μεγαλωφελής implies; they do not prove that the virtue was really practiced. But it is difficult to conceive of an utter neglect of what μεγαλωφελία stands for, when men were applying the term to God, to Nature, and to heroes of the past, with admiration.

Μεγαλοεργία.

Μεγαλοεργία, though found in Polybius, occurs with comparative frequency only in the time of Plutarch and after. Throughout the analysis that follows, we shall find a striking avoidance of assigning the quality of μεγαλοεργία to contemporary actors or events, and a consistent attribution of it to men and deeds, remote in time and place, to Nature and to God.

Polybius[1] informs us that Antiochus and Aemilius Paulus were rivals in "magnificence". Philo[2] with admiration, looks back to the time of Moses for his examples of μεγαλουργία. Josephus[3] applies the term to a place of uncommon splendor, in Phoenicia. Plutarch[4] predicates the quality of Alexander the Great, of Demetrius, of the Athens of Pericles' day, of Cato Major and of the Roman consul Caninius Rebilus,—always with approval. Plutarch's testimony to the confusion of ὠμότης and μεγαλουργία in his own time, is witness to a perverted moral judgment and proof of the absence rather than of the presence of the second of the two qualities. Lucian[5] attributes τὸ μεγαλουργόν to Alexander, together with τὸ μηδὲν μικρὸν ἐπινοεῖν. Appian[6], too, turns to the past and finds μεγαλοεργία in the character of Ptolemy Philadelphus, of Mithridates, of Hannibal, of Scipio, of Pompey the Great, and their is no question of his admiration for the

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The potentiality, at least, was there in Plutarch's day and this was so strong—as the coinage of the term indicates and as the unreserved admiration of the virtue shows—that it is quite within the bounds of possibility and of probability that the potentiality of which we have evidence, was an actuality, at least a striving to perform great services. μεγαλο- compounds are numerous in the earlier literature, e. g. μεγαλογνώμων, -δοξος, -δωρος, -κίνδυνος, -νοια, πράγμων, -πρεπής, σθενής, -φρων, ψυχος, μεγαλήγορος, μεγαλήνωρ, μεγαλαυχία;—comparatively late are μεγαλο-εργία, -πάθεια, -ποιέω, μεγαλωσύνη. But there are a number of significant late μικρο- compounds!

1. Polyb. 31.3.1.
2. Philo. ii. 142; i. 405.26; ii. 21.46; ii. 105.16.
3. Jos. Ant. 15.9.6.
4. Plut. Caes. 58, (i. 735A), i. 191D; i. 344B; i. 705A; i. 897 D; ii. 183B; ii. 456F.
5. Luc. Alex. 4; Calumn. 17.
6. App. i. 14.7; i. 816.42; ii. 6.86; ii. 155.19; ii. 235.22; ii. 270.16.

quality of μεγαλοεργία. Philostratus[7] uses the term to describe a natural situation, and in reflecting upon the deeds of Xerxes, of Darius and of Agamemnon. Eusebius'[8] complaint that men, wondering at the marvels of architecture, forget the architect, as those, marvelling at God's work, neglect his worship,—is not far removed from Nectar's[9] religious enthusiasm and ascription of μεγαλοεργία to God, who thereby reveals the greatness of his goodness.

While the idea of the activity, expressed by the word, was present to the mind of the Greeks who coined and employed the term, there is no evidence from the literature in which the word occurs, that the activity itself was present[10] for the same period. On the contrary, there is constant reference either to the great figures of the past history of the pagan world or to the supernatural, with full admiration for the virtues of μεγαλοεργία. Just as far as the Greek world coined and employed this word with reference to great events abroad and far away, the term becomes a strange satire on the Greek's own insignificance in certain of the great activities of the world. The word and its usage betray the essential *weakness* of the people that proceeded no farther than a neologism,—however strong their ambition to imitate might have been or however great their passive indifference and indecision might have been. The wide currency of the term is important, as it shows the extent of the mental state that thus expressed itself,—whether incipient energy, that, however, never attained to effective action, or whether a mere passive regard for the accomplishments of others was responsible for the coinage of the term.

In either event, in time, a sense of weakness was bound to prevail, sooner or later, among the people whose own μεγαλοεργία was of a *phantom nature!* Such a sense of feebleness inevitably bred melancholy.

Though there was a spark of the old pride[11] in him still,

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7. Philostr. 2. 221.3 and 9.
8. Eus. ii. 1380 B.
9. Nectar 1825 A. (cf. also Simoc. 5.2).
10. κενοδοξία and κενοσπουδία (treated later) were existing evils.
11. Cf. ταπεινοφροσύνη, treated earlier.

nevertheless the Greek's generally weak character[12] accounts for the passive nature of μεγαλοεργία, an expression not of real "magnificence", but rather of pseudo-greatness in many repects[13]. The growing consciousness of the latter fact reacted, doubtless, upon the resignation essential to the full development of those other virtues, ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια and ἀνεξικακία[14].

Κενοδοξία.

Out of the list of very many κενο- compounds, we have chosen κενοδοξία and κενοσπουδία as particularly significant. The importance of these ideas to the morality of the age under consideration is obvious[1].

The term κενοδοξία is found in the Septuagint and in Aristeas and in Polybius, but appears much more frequently in and after the first century A. D.! There is no ambiguity about the meaning of the word, no question about the existence of "frivolity" and "conceit", no doubt about the feeling entertained toward these.

From the testimony of the Septuagint[2] that idols have come into the world through the κενοδοξία of men (frivolous-mindedness), to that of Aristeas[3] that the tastes of the κενόδοξοι are inferior, we pass to Polybius[4] who not only con-

12. As shown by our study of μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιΐα; we do not mean moral weakness.

13. Even in the direction of κοινωφελία, which might have been fully realized, if μεγαλοεργία had been genuine.

14. The μεγαλο- compounds in the older literature, whether of mind, of soul, courage, labor, speech, reputation or generosity, are numerous: μεγαλό-θυμος, -γνώμων, -όδοξος, -όδωρος, -όνοια, -πόνηρος, -πράγμων, -πρέπεια, -σχήμων, -φρονέω, -ψυχία, μεγαληγορία, μεγαληνορία. μεγαλοεργία represents no new concept, but a return in thought (cf. also μεγαλοποιέω) to the past, glowing with great deeds.

1. Κενόφρων, κενολογέω, κενότης (and also μικρολογία) are terms found in the older literature, as well as a number of other κενο- compounds, less important. The idea of κενοδοξία is not an altogether new one, but the *frequent* use of the word in later literature gives it great significance.

2. LXX. Sap. 14.14.

3. Aristeas 2.

4. Polyb. 3.81.9; 27.6.12; 10.33.6; 39.1.1.

demns Hasdrubal, the Carthaginians, Polyaratus for κενοδοξία which he associated with other evils as ἀλαζονεία and ἀπειρία,—but also, through Hannibal, complains that προπέτεια, θρασύτης, θυμός ἄλογος, κενοδοξία and τῦφος incline to ἐπιβουλὴ, ἐνέδρα and ἀπάτη.

Diodorus Siculus[5] tells the tale of the death of Calanus, an Indian philosopher, contemporary of Alexander, whose spectacular death some condemned as an exhibition of κενοδοξία, "vanity". Paul[6] writes to the Philippians and to the Galatians against "vain-glory", exhorting "lowliness of mind"; his sermon was, of course, inspired by fear that the evils existed. The previous impressions are confirmed by the evidence of Plutarch[7] who regretfully complains of the anger of the covetous man, the glutton, the jealous man, the κενόδοξος, whose examples he laments, as well as that of the flatterer who is not ashamed to call "ambition", "fruitless vanity". Philo[8] dramatically represents κενοδοξία as a wild beast, lying in wait to destroy those who engage in it, and it is the δημοκόπος who is the κενόδοξος. Further, κενοδοξία is included in a category of other social evils, presumably contemporaneous. ὁ κενόδοξος was a fact in the life of Marcus Aurelius[9], who scorns such a one and his "little glory", δοξάριον. According to Arrian[10] and Epictetus, the law takes cognizance of the κενόδοξος who is set down with the ἀλαζών. Lucian[11] humorously represents Hermes as begging Zeus to lay aside ἀλαζονεία, ἀμαθία, κενοδοξία, τῦφος, ματαιοπονία, μικρολογία, ὀργή and many other faults. Porphyrius[12] attributes the κενοδοξία of the men of his own day, source of great misfortunes, to the enmity of demons. We find the term as late as Heliodorus[13], applied to the Egyptians.

The Ecclesiastical literature tells much the same tale

5. Diod. Sic. 17.107.5.
6. N. T. Ep. Phil. 2.3; Ep. Gal. 5.26.
7. Plut. ii.57D; ii.457B.
8. Philo. i.613.11; i.401.19; ii.47.16; ii.376.44.
9. M. Anton. 5.1.
10. Arr. Epict. 3.24.43.
11. Luc. D. Mort. 10.8.
12. Porph. Abst. ii.40.
13. Heliod. 9.19.

regarding this word κενοδοξία. Polycarp[14] had said to the Roman proconsul, with scorn, εἰ κενοδοξεῖς. Clemens Romanus[15] in a letter to the Corinthians promises them salvation, if they cast off injustice, strife, malice, slander, pride, "vain-glory". Ignatius[16] betrays his aversion to κενοδοξία, by praising those who have in place of it, love of the Lord. In the language of the Tatian[17] the same feeling exists. Eusebius[18] ridicules a certain Lacydas for his κενοδοξία, while, finally, in Chrysostomus[19] we read: ὁ γάρ τεταπεινωμένος καὶ συντετριμμένος οὐ κενοδοξήσει, οὐκ ὀργιεῖται, οὐ φθονῆσει τῷ πλησίον, οὐκ ἄλλο τι δέξεται πάθος, which, open to but one interpretation, brings the same conviction that the previous testimonies have created.

We have, thus, abundant evidence of the long-continued, wide-spread evil of κενοδοξία, which, signifying, now, "frivolity", now, "conceit", meaning frivolous-mindedness, vanity, vain-glory—is combated as an existing evil! not only in the Plutarchean age (when the κενόδοξος was a well-known type of the day), but before and after that time as well, an evil deep-rooted in the character of the Greek of the first century A. D.!

Such a mental state implies a loss of greater or more serious interests. It is a state of mind that belongs to men of lesser intellectual stature; it is significantly enough but once applied to a Roman, and then, hypothetically.

With its signification of "frivolity", its effect on politics is obvious; meaning also "conceit", its influence in the realm of ethics upon the new ethical standard would be equally deleterious. It was an excess, doubtless, of κενοδοξία that provoked the opposition to it that we have noted; that very excess carried with it the possibility of a cure and might in time inspire the opposite virtue of real modesty which the Christian Fathers exhorted.

As long, however, as κενοδοξία flourished, there was little

14. Polyc. 10.
15. Clem. R. i.35.
16. Ignat. 697 A.B.
17. Tatian. 832 B.
18. Eus. (Numen. apud) iii.1209 A.
19. Joan. Chrys. vii. 43 A.

hope for ταπεινοφροσύνη, and the evil of κενοδοξία, "conceit", without doubt, was one of the forces that interfered with the development of ταπεινοφροσύνη[20]. The weakness of "frivolity" (κενοδοξία) co-operated with that of μετριοπάθεια and of ἀνεξικακία, and helps to explain the negative element in ἀγαθοποιΐα and the negative nature of μεγαλοεργία, while the "vanity" of κενοδοξία would prevent the state of equality essential for a Utopian κοινωφελία.

Vanity, pride, conceit[21] were, as every one knows, essential qualities of the pagan world. But the Greek world had not, before this, reached the point where it could pronounce that judgment upon itself, which we read in the word κενοδοξία itself, and hear proclaimed in literature from Polybius to Heliodorus. The study of κενοδοξία admirably shows the position of the Greek of the first century A. D., who is still Greek, to the extent that he is "vain", κενόδοξος, but un-Greek, in that he condemns that pride and holds it sinful or "frivolous".

Here we find (as in μεγαλοεργία) the possible genesis of a melancholy, which manifests itself more pronouncedly in κενοσπουδία.

Περιαυτολογία.

Let us subordinate περιαυτολογία to κενοδοξία, to which it is very closely related.

The word περιαυτολογία appears for the first time in Plutarch. The quality of "boastfullness" that it refers to, is one that existed long before Plutarch and one for which there were many other expressions. (μεγαλαυχία, μεγαληγορία, κομπάζω, κομπέω, ὑψηλολογέομαι, σεμνογογέω, καυχάω, στωμυλία, στομφασμός, αὐχέω, ἀπειλέω, ἀλαζονεύομαι; this is a partial list of the earlier terms denoting "boasting". In view of these many terms, the appearance of περιαυτολογία is all the more remarkable.) The coinage of this new term and, no less, the continuance, in use, of the group of older terms, evince the persistence of certain

20. Cf. previous study of ταπεινοφροσύνη.

21. We need but to recall χαυνότης, ματαιότης, ἀγλαΐα, μεγαληνορία, αὐθαδία, ὄγκος, μεγαλοφροσύνη, τῦφος and δοκησισοφία. The following from Aristotle (Eth. N. 2.7.7) expresses clearly the old artistic standard of judgment and the consequent grounds of objection: περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία.

features of Greek character, certain qualities that were a *heritage of the past* (cf. also ταπεινοφροσύνη discussion) and which were not easily surrendered! (The vitality of the term is of much significance and is such as to dispel any suspicion that,—because the cases of occurrence of the term are rather infrequent—the quality was of little consequence in life.)

Plutarch's (Plut. ii. 29B; ii. 41C; ii. 539C) condemnation of περιαυτολογία is expressed in no uncertain terms; together with μεγαλαυχία, it is contrasted with ἀτυφία and μετριότης; it is characterized as ἐταχθές and ἀνελεύθερον and the moralist adds: ἔργῳ δ' οὐ πολλοὶ τὴν ἀηδίαν αὐτοῦ διαπεφεύγασιν. Sextus Empiricus (Sext. Emp. π. Υ. i. 62.) mocks the dogmatists whom he criticizes as τετυφωμένων καὶ περιαυτολογούντων. Iamblichus (Iambl. 91.8; Myst. 90.9) stigmatizes περιαυτολογία, calling it τὸ ἀπατηλόν. Porphyrius, (Porphyr. Aneb. 32.12) claiming that τὸ περιαυτολογεῖν was common to gods, demons and other superior beings, and was token of the god's presence, is contradicted by Iamblichus, who grants them truth, instead of "boasting". Origen's (Origen. i. 752B) words are significant: ἐνιδεῖν δὲ ἔστι καὶ τῷ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἤθει πανταχοῦ περιϊσταμένον τὴν περιαυτολογίαν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λέγοντος: "Κἂν ἐγὼ εἴπω περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, ἡ μαρτυρία μου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής." Eustathius (Eust. 100. 37; 897.2) describing Nestor, says, without disapproval, τοιοῦτος οὖν ὁ Νέστωρ ὢν πολλαχοῦ περιαυτολογεῖ, while, in another passage, interpreting Homer, his language is as follows: ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνταῦθα κυριολεκτουμένου κομπεῖν τὸ κομπάζειν παρῆκται, ὃ παρὰ τοῖς ὕστερον, στωμυλύειν δηλοῖ καὶ στομφασμὸν περιαυτολογικόν.

The word is an expression of one side of the Greek's nature, the other side of which is represented by such terms as ταπεινοφροσύνη and ἀνεξικακία. But just as far as κενοδοξία interrupted the progress of ταπεινοφροσύνη and ἀνεξικακία, so, too, the presence of περιαυτολογία militated against "humility" and "forbearance", and along with these, against the "quality of mercy", included in κοινωφελία. At the same time, these virtues act against περιαυτολογία and seek to overcome it; the real vanity and inanity of the boasting strain for which περιαυτολογία stands is evidenced by the presence of κενοσπουδία and of ματαιοπονία!

Περιαυτολογία, like κενοδοξία, is a companion term to μεγαλοεργία, and was justified as far as the latter term was an index of real accomplishment, but become a *hollow pretence*, when we recognize the unreality of μεγαλοεργία.

In a moral atmosphere, however, of which ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια and ἀγαθοποιία are products, the quality of περιαυτολογία was naturally condemned, and that condemnation and distrust, such as we find in Plutarch, led, perhaps, somewhat to its suppression,—though that very moral greatness would be the chief ground for a justifiable περιαυτολογία!

[The suggestions derived from the passages in which πειθήνιος occurs, are not insignificant.

Πειθήνιος (It is not our object, here, to determine, completely, the nature and the limits of "obedience" in Greek ethics. For this idea there were many expressions in the older language, as ὑπήκοος, χειροήθης, πειθαρχία, εὐπείθεια, ὑπακούω, ἀκρόασις, πεισιχάλινος, κατήκοος, πιθανός, εὐήνιος, εὐήκοος. Πειθήνιος may have been formed after analogy of πεισιχάλινος or πειθαρχία; what motive was behind the creation of this new term it were difficult to determine.) is another member of the new vocabulary of the first century A. D. and reveals considerable regarding the problem of "obedience".

When Plutarch (Plut. ii. 592 B; ii. 90 B; ii. 442 C; ii. 102 F; ii. 369 C; ii. 1029 E; i. 58 D; i. 176 A; i. 596 C; i. 878 F.) refers to Roman or to Spartan life, "obedience" is explicitly represented as due to the authority of law and of administration; these instances are, perhaps, cited—as usual in Plutarch's Lives—for emulation. Within the limits of Greek conduct, *reason and divine power* are in control and exact "obedience". Philo (Philo. i. 184.5.) also imagines reason as mistress of the soul, while to the mind of Clemens Alexandrinus (Cl. Al. i. 1012 B; ii. 460 A.) the supreme power is vested in God, whose example is followed in worldly affairs and to whom "obedience" is due. (We also find the term in M. Anton. (i. 17), who rejoiced in a wife, πειθήνιος and φιλόστοργος,—in Pollux (i. 219) who uses it in its strictly literal sense, —in Soranus (p. 220), who employs it in a medical way).

The ideal subservience to reason, to Fate, to Daemons, to God, allowing much scope for individualism, does not deny the possibility of willing surrender; at the same time that περιαυτολογία and κενοδοξία found a place in men's consciousness, ταπεινοφροσύνη (under certain conditions) was exercised and brotherly love was encouraged! The complex character of this virtue meant a Greek appreciation of "obedience" that did not enslave but which allowed freedom at the moment of surrender.

The complexity of such "obedience" is closely identified with the combined *religious and rational* tone of later Greek ethics. Conduct had at once an intellectual justification and sought a divine sanction! Freedom was not surrendered, nor was authority denied!]

Κενοσπουδία.

Out of the mental state implied by κενοδοξία, κενοσπουδία could and did result, and we find it, first, shortly before the first century B. C. The suspicion that the word itself is a symbol of a "zealous pursuit of frivolities" and of the "frivolity of zeal", in the life of the Greeks of the first century A. D., is confirmed by a study of the passages in which the term occurs; neither element of the word is new; but that

σπουδή should be so κενή as to form a single concept denotes a fixity of the idea, and signifies more than mere occasional expressions of the futility of zeal and of labor; the single word is concrete evidence of the fact that the idea was abroad, while the wide and free use of the word would seem to indicate the actual importance of the feeling which the word defines; the literature betrays the regret felt because of the fact of κενοσπουδία, a fact that pressed heavily upon the moral consciousness of the age.

The word is variously applied to certain minor endeavors, to trivial events and to the whole of human conduct. Cicero[1] refers to problems of idle curiosity touching events in Brundisium in the year 49 B. C., as κενόσπουδα[2]. Dionysius of Halicarnassus[3] characterizes the laughable conduct of Lucius Junius Brutus (contemporary of Appius Claudius), as κενοσπουδία. To Josephus[4] the idea was not unknown and it was referred to the times of Herod. Plutarch's[5] condemnation of κενοσπουδία grows out of the bitterness of his own experience; while it is unthinkable that God is μικρός and κενόσπουδος, men *are* so and zealously fritter away their energy upon profitless things; ὁ κενόσπουδος is opposed (and defined by the antithesis) to ὁ φιλόπονος. The same moral earnestness appears in Marcus Aurelius[6], and his sweeping denunciation includes almost all of men's activities, under the head of κενοσπουδία! Hermas'[7] scorn for the κενόσπουδος whom he knows from life, is paralleled by that of Artemidorus[8], whose discrimination leads him into condemnation. Hipparchus[9] defines the "zealous frivolity" of a dilettant mathematician,

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1. Cic. Att. 9.1.
2. It is not remarkable that Cicero knew this comparatively new term (cf. also ἀνεξικακία); Cicero knew his Greek! His knowledge of the term is not at all proof of its age, but rather of its wide currency,—perhaps wider than its comparatively infrequent appearance in literature would suggest.
3. Dion. H. 6.70.
4. Jos. Ant. 16.4.3.
5. Plut. ii. 560 B; ii. 1061 C; ii. 234 D; 1069 C.
6. M. Anton. 4.32; 7.3.
7. Herm. Sim. 9.5.
8. Artemid. 4.11; 4,82.
9. Hipparch. 1016 B.

by contrasting the seriousness of a φιλαλήθης with his κενοσπουδία. The pious enthusiasm of Clemens[10] of Alexandria carries him into extravagant denials of the value of life apart from religion, and leads him to praise life in the desert ἐκτὸς πάσης κενοσπουδίας, ἀπειραγαθίας, μικροπρεπείας. Clemens Alexandrinus could have sympathized with Plutarch and with Marcus Aurelius. Although Diogenes Laërtius[11] looks back to the time of Plato[12], his reproach does not belong distinctly to that earlier age any more than his general reflection; ὅσα συντείνει εἰς τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ κενόσπουδον ἅμα καὶ παιδαριῶδες τῶν ἀνθρώπων, which possesses a universal value. His association of κενοσπουδία with τῦφος is also suggestive. Finally, Stobaeus[13] employs the word, expressing a thought he attributes to Socrates[14].

After the passing of the conditions that created the social ethics of Plato, the aesthetic ethics of Aristotle, the individual ethics of Zeno and of Epicurus, a condition inevitably arose, in which κενοσπουδία was prominent! We wonder that we do not find the word earlier in literature. The growth of a futile or *frivolous zeal* ended in an ultimate belief in the *futility of all zeal!* Κενοσπουδία, the result of κενοδοξία, is the very antithesis of a genuine μεγαλοεργία, though a natural concomitant of a mythical μεγαλοεργία. Melancholy was a natural result of the regret, (that we have found evidence of) at the prevalence of κενοσπουδία. We find a more distinctly marked pessimism in connection with κενοσπουδία than we have before.

We find, to be sure, sporadic strains of melancholy in the earlier literature; but οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν. and ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν εἴδωλ' ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην σκιάν, and other similar lines do not represent the prevailing

10. Clem. Al. i. 532 B; i. 216 B.

11. Diog. L. 6.26; 9.68.

12. Diogenes Laërtius is probably no more quoting exactly, here, than before, in the case of μετριοπάθεια. (Cf. previous treatment of that word.)

13. Stob. 534.23.

14. Σωκράτης ἔλεγε νομίζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς θεοὺς γελᾶν ὁρῶντας τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κενοσπουδίαν. It is little likely, we think, that Socrates knew this word which we find, first, in Hipparchus and in Cicero.

spirit of the earlier age, nor is melancholy characteristic, in general, of the Greek nature, which,—active, boastful, talkative, fickle, not above lying, beauty-loving, speculative and brave,—was not pessimistic. We find no Lucretius, no Rubáiyát in Greek literature! The consciousness of the folly and futility and emptiness of human endeavor does, however, assert itself more strongly after the great conquests, and the presence of this word, under consideration, is no less a sign of that feeling than was the rise of a School of Skeptics much earlier. But the Greek was not incurably pessimistic and even τῆς δὲ κακίας ἀναπέπλησται πάντα πράγματα καὶ πᾶς ὁ βίος εὐθὺς ἐκ παρόδου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι κορωνίδος ἀσχημονῶν καὶ ἐκπίπτων καὶ ταραττόμενος καὶ μηδὲν ἔχων μέρος καθαρὸν μηδ' ἀνεπίληπτον, ὡς οὗτοι λέγουσι, (i.e. the Stoics) αἴσχιστόν ἐστι δραμάτων ἁπάντων καὶ ἀτερπέστατον[15] represents only one side of Stoicism, and even such strong condemnations provoked, in time, only a feeling of equality and of wider sympathy, but not of despair. Thes adness of κενοσπουδία is, however, indisputable.

Κενοσπουδία, involving τῦφος, the opposite of φιλόπονος and of φιλαλήθης, is, like κενοδοξία, twin-sister of μικροεργία, and becomes a true expression of a petty age that worshiped μεγαλοεργία as a distant ideal! Pride, feebleness and sadness were conspicuous among the qualities of the Greek of Plutarch's century!

Ματαιοπονία.

We find ματαιο-, compounded with nouns of action[1] occasionally before the first century A. D.,—but such cases are sporadic in comparison with the numerous later occurrences.

Ματαιοπονία is applied to a wide range of activities, being even predicated, though negatively, of God and of Nature. Ματαιοπονία is by no means a new idea in Greek life, within which, from Homer's time on, much πόνος or σπουδή must have seemed μάταιος. The later interpretation of what constituted ματαιοπονία is also quite a universal one, and Polybius and Livy, Strabo and Pheidias, Plutarch and Plato, Lucian and Homer might easily have been in agreement, touching the

15. Plut. ii. 1066 A. (cf. too ii. 478 A. seq).

1. We have taken into consideration, ματαιοπονία, -πὸνημα, -πραγία, -σπουδία, -εργία.

folly of what is termed ματαιοπονία. But as in the case of κενοσπουδία, the later close association of ματαιο- with a considerable number of other ideas is significant; the words thus formed where not fashioned for a day, and suggest the growth of a feeling of ματαιότης!

Polybius[2] records his own keen disapproval of ματαιοπονία, as well as that of the Romans. The scholiasts[3] of Aristophanes and of Sophocles used the term ματαιοπονέω to define less well-known words from their authors; θορυβεῖν and κοῦφα λαλεῖν, also employed to illuminate the same text, at the same time also explain the commentator's attitude toward an existing ματαιοπονία. Strabo[4] finds an example of ματαιοπονία, in the case of an Egyptian temple of barbaric κατασκευή, which, to his mind, possessed little of grace. Philo[5] denies that the quality of ματαιοπονία can be predicated either of Nature or of God. His conception of ματαιοπονία is graphically stated: νηπίων παίδων . . . . οἳ πολλάκις παρ' αἰγιαλοῖς ἀθύροντες ψάμμου γεωλόφους διανιστᾶσι καὶ ἔπειθ' ὑφαιροῦντες ταῖς χερσὶ πάλιν ἐρείπουσι. Plutarch[6] expresses his own conviction, in applying the term ματαιοπονία to useless indulgence in grief. The satirist Lucian[7] includes ματαιοπονία among ἀλαζονεία, ἀμαθία, ἔρις, κενοδοξία, μικρολογία and other no less censurable evils, unworthy of the gods. Iamblichus[8] represents Pythagoras as characterizing the ordinary duties of life that interfere with philosophy, as ματαιοπόνημα. To Clemens Romanus[9], ματαιοπονία consisted in idle inquiry regarding the future of the soul. Justin's[10] hypothetical statement of the ματαιοπονία of God is, of course, an expression of his own condemnation of that quality in life. Olympiodorus'[11] opinion of ματαιοσπουδία is shown by his association and identification of it with τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα τῶν ὀνείρων φαντάρματα and τὴν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἄκαιρον φλυαρίαν. Epiphan-

2. Polyb. 9.2.2; 25.5.11.
3. Schol. Ar. Plutus. 575; Soph. O. T. 887.
4. Strabo. 806.
5. Philo. 2.500; 2.98.52.
6. Plut. ii. 119 D.
7. Luc. Dial. Mort. 10.8.
8. Iambl. Vita Pyth. 24.
9. Clementina. i. 60 B; i. 27. B.
10. Just. Frag. 1585 A.
11. Olymp. A. 541 C.

ius'[12] condemnation of ματαιοεργία is not less unequivocal. Philostorgius[13], also, draws from his own experience for an illustration of ματαιοσπουδία, which is used of idle, trivial occupation[14].

We have, thus, a record of a *wide-felt disapproval of a wide-spread* ματαιοπονία! In the light of the evidence furnished by κενοσπουδία, the development is strongly suggested of an atmosphere of idleness and of inactivity, or one of labor and zeal that were trivial and therefore condemned. The words of Plutarch[15] are, perhaps, significant in this connection: καὶ μόλις ἂν νῦν ὅλη [Ἑλλάς] παράσχοι τρισχιλίους ὁπλίτας, ὅσους ἡ Μεγαρέων μία πόλις ἐξέπεμψεν εἰς Πλαταιέας . . . . περὶ τὸ Πτῷον ὅπου μέθ' ἡμέρας ἐντυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ νέμοντι. Evidence of the same weariness appear in the language of Strabo[16] who writes of Athens that her navy was "almost extinct, that little remained of her Long Walls, and of the lower city no more than a small part of the maritime quarter". Thebes was hardly deserving of the name of village, and the same was true of all the Boeotian towns except Tanagra and Thespiae. Dion[17] gives a more picturesque description of Thebes when he says that "only a single statue stood erect among the ruins of the ancient market-place". Pausanias[18] in the second century, is our best witness of "shrunken or ruined cities, deserted villages, roofless temples, shrines without images and pedestals without statues, faint vestiges of places

12. Epiph. i. 417 A.

13. Philostorg. H. E. 11.1.

14. Ματαιοσπουδία is found in Suicer, with this comment: οὐδὲν ὀνείρων διαλλάττουσιν αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ματαιοσπουδίαι. Eustathius (543) uses ματαιοπραγία of the idle, lazy, useless exertion of Homeric heroes. Of the numerous ματαιο- compounds, some are, of course, earlier, some later, in origin; ματαιολογέω,—like μωρολογία, μικρολογία, φλυαρία and λαλέω and κενολογία—belongs to the older literature. We have chosen and treated ματαιοπονία, because of its close relation with κενοσπουδία. Ματαιοτεχνία is also interesting and is defined by Quintilian (2.20.3) as "supervacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali habeat, sed vanum laborem".

15. Plut. ii. 414 A.

16. Strabo. ix. 1 and 2.

17. Dion. Chr. vii. Or. p. 136. Dind.

18. Frazer: Pausanias. p. xiv. Intr. (with ref's) vol. i.

that once had a name and played a part in history". It is well-known that through imperial favor Greece enjoyed, for two centuries, a high degree of tranquillity and of repose: this but encouraged her own settled calm, her state of lethargy and of exhaustion. When men are strong and are vitally engaged in their own occupations, which are all absorbing, then ματαιοπονία and κενοσπουδία are foreign to their lives; the temper of this age, however, of Plutarch's age was not far removed from — "ματαιόπους ματαιοπόνως, εἶπεν ὁ ἐκκλησιαστής, ματαιότης ματαιοτήτων, τὰ πάντα ματαιότης".

Μισαδελφία.

This is a term we do not find in literature before Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus[1], who calls the Roman character μισοπονηρία and αἰδώς, represents Horatius reviling his sister with the epithets κακοδαιμονεστάτη and μισάδελφε. The Greek's knowledge of the evil of μισαδελφία is evidenced no less than his belief that the evil was a universal one in time and place. Plutarch's[2] sweeping denunciation of μισαδελφία grew out of the bitterness of his conviction that φιλαδελφία was as rare in his day as μισαδελφία had been in the time of the ancients; in his own day, if we can believe his words, it was a common social evil which he deeply deplored. Philo[3] recognizes the presence of the μισάδελφος and of the μισανθρωπος, whose evil influences he seeks to overcome. The exhortations of the ecclesiastics[4] not to honor μισαδελφία before φιλαδελφία, to oppose φιλονεικία, to avoid envy and μισαδελφία, to seek goodness, love and peace are clear enough condemnation of a social evil whose effects they knew from experience and dreaded accordingly.

From Dionysius of Halicarnassus, then, through at least the fourth century A. D., we find testimony to the existence of this evil, which meets with a bitter condemnation[5].

1. Dion. H. i. 464.9.
2. Plut. ii. 478 C., ii. 482 C.
3. Philo. i. 671.47.
4. Patriarch. 1145 B; Athan. i. 305 B; Basil. ii. 820 B.
5. We cannot believe that the idea of μισαδελφία is an entirely new one, born at this late period of Greek ethics; μισανθρωπος is a partial

Plutarch's extreme, pessimistic view must be taken "cum grano salis"; his argument for the very great prevalence[6] of μισαδελφία in his own day and a corresponding rarity of φιλαδελφία is invalid, as the same argument could be adduced to prove the contrary. And, in fact, the essay "De Fraterno Amore" is more evidence, perhaps, to the contrary of Plutarch's statement than his argument is proof for the affirmative. There can be no doubting the fact, however, that the evil, whether wide-spread or no, affected the mind of the age with a certain horror, if Plutarch be a true representative. The appearance of the term, if it was coined at this time, is evidence, probably, not so much of the prevalence of the evil which is deprecated, as of *a deeper moral consciousness* and an acuter sense of sin!

With a growing "humility" and "forbearance", both earlier in time than μισαδελφία, *such* an attitude is easily comprehensible. Further, the weakness, suggested by μετριοπάθεια and ἀνεξικακία, would break down the hostility necessary for a prolonged μισαδελφία. The religious character of κοινωφελία, the generosity of ἀγαθοποιΐα—would also contribute to the charity that opposed μισαδελφία[7]. Under such circumstances, the evil of μισαδελφία could hardly thrive, while the feeling against it would naturally be very strong.

Κοσμοπολίτης.

Though the term κοσμοπολίτης seems to be quite late in Greek literature, the conception of world-citizenship had presented itself, long before the first century A. D., to the mind of the Stoics and of the Cynics (Diog. L. 6.63. Lucian i. 548). The idea was present to the imagination of the first century and, as Philo (Philo. i.1.18; i.657.6; ii.106.2. Moses

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expression of the same feeling and is as old as Demosthenes and Plato. It is a matter or some surprise that the word μισαδελφία, was not created earlier, as was its opposite φιλαδελφία. There are many late μισο-, μισα- compounds. The *feeling* entertained toward μισαδελφία in the first century A. D. is, however, of more importance than the problem of the exact time, of the creation of this term!

6. The moralist's expression is, rather, merely one of protest than an accurate index of the extent of the evil; cf., for another exaggeration, Plut. ii. 1066 A.

7. Perhaps, such late terms, as φιλαλληλία, ἀδελφότης, φιλευσέβεια, φιλοσυμπαθής and φιλοσυνήθης are significant, in this connection.

is Philo's example of such lofty citizenship.) understood the character, the κοσμοπολίτης was a citizen of the universe, subject to the law of the whole κόσμος or to the regulations of Nature. Further, the soul that was κοσμοπολῖτις, was also θεοφιλής and consecrated itself to the service of God, not enrolled in any one city, but through divine interest, possessing the whole world. In the social fabric of the first century, the concept was quite as natural to Greek as to Hebrew. For both,—the idea had a religious as well as a political significance, and Epictetus (Epict. 2.10.3.), though using the different phrase πολίτης κόσμου, further illustrates the moral obligations of world-citizenship (The *few* passages cited, in which this word occurs, do not militate against the belief in a *wide* currency of this term,–a belief resting upon the frequent repetition of the word in inscriptions; the same is true of μεγαλωφελής.).

While the fact of the κοσμοπολίτης,—of the man who ignored the barriers of race and of religion, of the citizen of the world who recognized a universal divinity and a universal philanthropy—is plainly established, his *religious* character is as much emphasized as his *ethical* or his *political*.

The way was doubtless, in part at least, prepared for such a character by the humanizing influences of such virtues as ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιΐα, and κοινωφελία; the hostility entertained toward μισαδελφία, likewise was favorable toward a universal friendship; the leveling tendency of these habits of thought broke down narrow, local prejudices and made for the cosmopolitanism, represented by ὁ κοσμοπολίτης.

Ἠθοποιΐα.

While ἠθοποιΐα, with a moral suggestion, was not unknown to Aristotle[1 & 2], while to rhetoricians after Callistratus ἠθοποιΐα was well-known as a rhetorical term, in the first century A. D. the word acquired a deep ethical significance of genuine value! The positive moral signification that the word then carries points, perhaps, to a deeper interest in the moral activity that the term defines!

Plutarch's well-known moral purpose, both in the "Moralia" and in the "Lives"[3], lends special interest to his frequent use[4] of the term ἠθοποιΐα. His discriminating use of ἠθοποιΐα

1. Arist. πλ. i. 955a 32. This case in Aristotle seems to be unique.
2. Another passage, Rh. iii. 7., illustrates a step in the formation of the term, ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγῃ τῇ ἕξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἦθος.
3. Plut. Pericl. 2.
4. Plut. i. 71 B; i. 961 D; ii. 814 A; ii. 660 B; ii. 799 B; i. 153 B; i 112 B; ii. 1053 D; ii. 450 F; 1.53 A.

i. e., in associating it with peace, bravery and justice in the case of the Romans, and with *σωφρονίζειν* and with noble pleasures in the case of the earlier Greeks suggest elements of his own moral ideal. Plutarch allows a wide range of *ἠθοποιία*, applying it to Spartans, to Sicilian Greeks and to his own times, socially and politically. There is no question of his own concern for philanthropy and for a "formation of character" which shall be secure! Philo[5], in the interests of an actual *ἠθοποιία*, declares the possibility of its realization through religion and through philosophy. In the absence of an exacter definition of the *ἦθος*, we can only conclude the presence of a desire for a noble "character formation". Strabo[6], in a dissertation on the humanizing results of Roman conquest, counts *ἠθοποιία* among the signs of civilization. *Ἠθοποιία* might, of course, according to the signification of the *ἦθος*, have a bad sense,—as when referring to the *ἀγωγὴν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς κιναίδοις διαλέκτων καὶ τῆς ἠθοποιίας*, in Ionia. The stricter moral sense, with an exhortation to practice, recurs in Clemens[7] of Alexandria: *πρακτικός δὲ ὢν ὁ παιδαγωγός, πρότερον μὲν εἰς διάθεσιν ἠθοποιίας προὐτρέψατο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν δεόντων ἐνέργειαν παρακαλεῖ.* Sextus Empiricus[8] controverts the belief of the Pythagoreans in an harmonious organization of the universe and the consequent value to be attached to *ἠθοποιοῖς μέλεσι.*

Ἠθοποιία[9] is also used in a different sense, of "delineation of character", by sophists and by rhetoricians from Callistratus to Longinus,—by Callistratus[10], of the *τέχνη* with which the Argo was built, by Dionysius[11] of Halicarnassus of Lysias and of Isocrates to whom he grants the most conspicuous *ἀρετή* in composition, *ἠθοποιία*; this receives a definition in the following: *ἠθοποιεῖ καὶ κατασκευάζει τὰ πρόσωπα τῷ λόγῳ πιστὰ καὶ χρηστά, προαιρέσεις τε αὐτοῖς ἀστείας ὑποτιθείς . . . . . καὶ*

5. Philo. i. 355.10; i. 302.41; i. 364.26; ii. 214.48.
6. Strabo. 648 C (14.1.41); 127 C. (2.5.26).
7. Clem. Al. i. 249 C.
8. Sext. Emp. M. 6.30; 6.36.
9. Similarly, *ἠθογράφος, ἠθολογία.*
10. Callistr. Stat. 10.
11. Dion. H. de Lys. c. 8. c. 19. Isocr. c. 11. (for *ἀνηθοποίητος*, Lys. c. 13).

λόγονς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀποδιδούς καὶ ταῖς τύχαις ἀκόλουθα φρονοῦντας εἰσάγων; Hermogenes[12] defined ἠθοποιία as μίμησις ἤθους ὑποκειμένου προσώπου, and classified it with other technical rhetorical terms, as προσωποποιία and εἰδωλοποιία; Longinus[13] includes it among προδιόρθωσις, ἐπιδιόρθωσις, ἀποσιώπησις, παράλειψις, εἰρωνεία. In other words, ἠθοποιία is purely a technical term of rhetoric, with no further moral signification; as a rhetorical term it was widely known and we also find it in Aphthonius[14], Nikolaüs, Phoebammon, Zonaeus; Eustathius[15], commenting on Homer, says: ἡ τοῦ Ἀτρείδου ψυχὴ καὶ φησὶν ἡ θοποιητικῶς.

While neither the Greek, the Hebraic, the Roman nor the Christian ideal has been exactly defined, above, the word is a symbol of an effort to attain a realization of those ideals! Widely[16] used, the word reveals a genuine desire to promote "character-formation", to upbuild nobility of character.

It were natural to conclude that ἠθοποιία meant, for the Greek of the first century A. D., a realization, in "character-formation", of elements that appealed to the age. Ἠθοποιία represents a conscious union of various ethical forces, represented by ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιία, κοινωφελία, μεγαλωφελία, μεγαλοεργία, πειθήνιος, φιλαδελφία, κοσμοπολίτης,— which, all, separately, factors in the ideal character of the age, became united in the perfect ἠθοποιία.

12. Hermog. Prog. 44.
13. Longin. Frag. 8.14; (for ἀνηθοποίητος, 34.3).
14. Cf. Rhetores Graeci, L. Spengel.
15. Eust. 1955.54 and 49.
16. ἀνηθοποίητος occurs in Cic. ad Att. 10.10.5, meaning "immoral".

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CONCLUSIONS.

In the previous discussion it has been shown that all of these words are expressions, concrete symbols of real facts in the Greek life of the first century A. D. The ethical movements that these words evidence were genuine factors in the life of the age that Plutarch represents. There where certain virtues in process of development, that were encouraged,—some of them more fully realized, others less so; there were certain vices whose existence was deplored and condemned.

The words themselves are partial evidence of the ethical situation, inasmuch as we can be certain that they were vital, (compare Chapter on "Method", also καινολογία and εὑρεσιλογία); their acceptance in the language, their long history shows them to be precipitates of genuine thinking and feeling of serious import. The extent of that ethical vocabulary, (which goes back in its beginning at least to the time of Polybius, and which developed in the time of Plutarch and includes both new ideas and old ones reinforced or altered), is further evidence of the width and depth of the moral agitation of the first century A. D. The ideas and conduct these words portray were determinative, and quite full testimony of such conduct is received from the literature before and after Plutarch's time representing actual conditions in life, as well as ideals[1].

The moral ideal of Plutarch is our immediate concern, but while we can establish certain data of his ethical standard, some of these data appear to be true for the whole *century* as well, as we find the same attitude observed in further literary and other sources of the same time as that of the great representative Boeotian; this attitude, develop-

1. It is thought that a complete study of the history of the entire ethical vocabulary found in Plutarch must make quite clear the nature of the moral ideal of the Greeks of the first century A. D., which is by no means as yet fully understood.

ing before, finally became established in the first century A. D. and continued long after, not only in time but also in place[2].

That moral agitation, which was undoubtedly sincere and deep rooted, is, in part at least, defined by the study we have made of a portion of the ethical terminology, which is no less a positive record of moral progress than the marbles of a fallen temple are witness of an ancient glory[3]. Plutarch's ethical ideal included the virtues of ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιΐα, κοινωφελία, μεγαλωφελής, φιλαδελφία, κοσμοπολίτης and combated the evils of κενοδοξία, περιαυτολογία, κενοσπουδία, ματαιοπονία; the ethical movement had a definite relation to the past but was also firmly established in the new conditions of the later age. Ταπεινοφροσύνη he received with great reserve, owing to an inherited strain of Greek pride; μετριοπάθεια was strongly exhorted; while in a way recalling the past, and even applied to Socrates, it was essentially a new virtue that implied much weakness; ἀνεξικακία is distinctly a new product that brought in its train opposition to τιμωρία, kindness toward slaves, toward the feeble, and toward a foe, that encouraged ἀοργησία and φιλανθρωπία; ἀγαθοποιΐα had a clear religious implication and κοινωφελία, quite a new term, was in time predicated of God as well as of man; Plutarch cherished this idea as he did that of μεγαλωφελής; curiously enough we find the latter term applied to God, nature, and heroes of the past, rather than to men of the present,—which is also true μεγαλοεργία. Plutarch sincerely regretted the μισαδελφία that existed in his own day, and was deeply affected by the evils of κενοδοξία, which he associated with covetousness, jealousy and flattery; no less bitterly did he condemn the περιαυτολογία of his own day, while the prevalent κενοσπουδία was actually responsible for a large degree of melancholy; ματαιοπονία was another fault of the age that disturbed the moralist; many of these faults were inherent in the Greek nature, but the practical philosophy of Plutarch contemplated their reform;

2. The "discussion" gives this information with such exactness as may be attained in this matter.

3. It should be borne in mind that this study is merely a "prolegomena" and that more evidence will be published at a later time.

the idea of πειθήνιος seems to have been complex, as the whole system of ethics was, which referred its laws now to man, now to God, now to human institutions, now to divine power. The ideal of character formation, ἠθοποιΐα, included, besides the above,—peace, bravery, justice, σωφροσύνη and noble pleasures. The entire group of words and concepts represents a deep moral earnestness, a positive longing for virtue and hatred of sin.

The ideas that we have, in large measure, been considering, separately, were also very closely inter-related. While suggestions have already been made of this correlation, it may be well, in conclusion, to pass all of the ideas in review, together.

As has already been established, the moral ideal was not merely a vision hovering before the mind of the age, but certain virtues, crystallizing, had penetrated the very heart of the Greek life and found a home there. The general tendency was toward a generous interpretation of life and of its obligations. A gradual appreciation of humility, (ταπεινοφροσύνη) the foundation-stone of this ethical structure, induced a mode of thought and a habit of feeling, favorable to a broad philanthropy, which, in private affairs, fostered an ideal of brotherly love (φιλαδελφία), and, in public matters, cherished the hope of world-citizenship (κοσμοπολίτης), when, reversing the old process, the individual sought the state. A new interpretation of control of the passions (μετριοπάθεια) was a resultant psychological necessity, and a noble forbearance (ἀνεξικακία) became a psychological possibility; the feebleness of these qualities undermined the aristocratic sense of pride, once an essential quality of Greek ethics. Advancing hand in hand, these democratic virtues proceeded to put into action (ἀγαθοποιΐα, μεγαλωφελής) their ideals but lacked the strength to initiate the universal amelioration (κοινωφελία) which should have been the logical issue of such effort. With a great capacity for sacrifice, this nature was smitten with a sad feebleness that made its inherited strain of pride a mockery and its chief ambition, a failure.

While sympathy was cosmopolitan and ethics received her law from religion, (cf. πειθήνιος, κοινωφελία, ἀγαθοποιΐα, ἀνεξικακία) there were, however, other forces present which checked

and complicated the onward movement of thought. Obedience (πειθήνιος) did not yield unquestioningly to the dictates of humility, but reserved for herself a large measure of freedom, by which the natural tendency and the final results of the ideas, previously considered, were necessarily held in abeyance. Frivolity and conceit (κενοδοξία) were native elements, not easily eradicated from the Greek character, though bitterly condemned by the age; humility won only a partial triumph over this foe. The representative voice of the age, to be sure, raised a protest against anger (ὀργή), but Plutarch, himself, was, as yet, still unable to extend an unreserved welcome to humility (ταπεινός). While there may have been a gain in generosity, that sentiment was still confined within serious limitations.

The evident earnestness of the moral movement had also to contend against a deep-seated languor, frivolous zeal, idle indifference (κενοσπουδία, ματαιοπονία). Though the Greek conscience was disturbed by these and regret was profound, the disease was not readily cured; and the Greek's boastfulness (περιαυτολογία), his ostentation and his egoism were a hollow pretence that left him in his weakness, melancholy and resigned.

In the midst of these contradictions, in the strife, on the one hand, between a noble generosity and an effort to be great through being good, and, on the other, a pride that was self-centered rather than altruistic,—in the conflict between sincerity and pretence, we see an unceasing yearning for the Golden Fleece of a Moral Ideal! There is no doubting the fact that there was a wide-spread belief in virtuous ideals and encouragement of virtuous acts! The condemnation the age passed upon its own weaknesses, the regret it felt at its own failures bespeak the earnestness to attain the goal of noble living. Aware of the presence of evil in his own nature which a conscientious introspection had revealed to him, the Greek's conscience was deeply stirred and he was impelled to purify his own heart. Incapable, perhaps, of inaugurating a universal reform, though not abandoning the the hope of it, the purity of the individual was his immediate aim! Thus, though the period was one of contradictions and of compromises, though paradoxes blocked progress,

public opinion seems to have taken a definite trend in a certain direction. With whatever longing the Greek may have reverted to the great days of long ago, (μεγαλοεργία, μεγαλωφελής) and whatever self-esteem (περιαυτολογία) he may have jealously cherished because of his past, the present need was inculcating new lessons of moral reform and the national "Geist" was being transformed. The Greek was no longer the Greek of old, with an aesthetic consecration to beauty but a new type of Greek, with a deep conviction of duty[4].

What the results to Greek ethics would have beeen, in the first century, had Greece been left alone to work out her own salvation without the intervention of Roman dominance, is a matter of fascinating, though idle speculation, (Polyb. xl. 5.12). Certain it is, however, that the Roman was quite unconscious of those hidden forces that were silently swaying the Greek multitude and making for noble character (ἠθοποιΐα), in spite of the external decadence! (cf. hist. introd.) That there was no great resultant organized social reform is a sad commentary on the weaknesses of an age, incapable of putting into complete effect, its own highest ideals. (Plin. Ep. x. 93. 94.) Historians of Greece, reflecting upon the political, economic, and social decline of the country, have failed to appreciate fully, the substratum of genuine worth in the Greek character, at this period! Although the moral ideal may not have gained universal validity, it had, nevertheless, strongly impressed itself upon the mind of the age, and a correct understanding of the period must recognize this fact as well as weigh the external events of history. In the gloaming of Greek political and economic life, when there was little of energetic activity (κενοδοξία, κενοσπουδία, ματαιοπονία) and as little energetic thinking, there was, nevertheless, a deep undercurrent of reflec-

4. The original contact with Rome may, perhaps, have stimulated the evolution of this sense; at any rate a moral atmosphere was developing not merely about Plutarch but throughout the Greek world; the political, economic, and social decline that was accompanied with great disasters was, perhaps, also ultimately responsible for this reaction. Principles of human conduct, seemingly fundamental, were undergoing slow and subtle alterations, the cumulative affect of which meant in time a complete transformation.

tion, that dwelt upon the broad sympathy of ἀγαθοποιΐα and the cosmopolitan philanthropy of κοινωφελία, the majesty of a past μεγαλοεργία and the possibility of a present μεγαλωφελία, that resented the pretensions of the Romans, with scorn, (περιαυτολογία, κενοδοξία), that went in imagination far beyond the limitations of municipal administration, granted by Roman authority[5], to ideas of universal citizenship (κοσμοπολίτης), that deemed ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία worthy of sincere consideration and which ended in resignation and sadness (μεγαλοεργία, κενοσπουδία, μισαδελφία). The results of Roman administration upon Greek character were both good and bad, but albeit this external influence was great, the internal evolution, whether because of it or in spite of it, was advancing toward lofty ideals of righteousness[6]. Roman love of conquest was, in Greek ethics, represented by a sense of sacrifice (ἀνεξικακία, μετριοπάθεια), Roman habit of self-indulgence was here balanced by a recognition of altruism (κοινωφελία), Roman pride was here met by a Greek ideal of humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη)!

It is not strange that the ethics of this period were eclectic in character; we find the artistic and the humanistic, the national and the cosmopolitan, the social and the individualistic, the objective and the subjective all contributing to this system of ethics; man hardly knew which claim was paramount and whether salvation was attainable through holiness or through wisdom, or through both! The ethical ideal was subject to theological, rational, natural, individual

5. A quasi-political renaissance, though the conquest of Greece was never more complete.

6. While the Greek's own great deeds were a thing of the past, while sorrow, the greatest leveler of all, colored his entire attitude toward life, despair did not yet seize upon him, for he felt that (μεγαλωφελής, μεγαλοεργία, κοινωφελής, ἀγαθοποιΐα) — Nature and God, at least, were great and good and that in Reason, he possessed the Ariadne—thread to lead him out of the labyrinth to his own ideals of the Conscience! The elements in his nature alien to his moral ideal, though they possessed all the force of inherited traits and of tradition, were opposed by a profound devotion to duty, by a sense of goodness, purity and holiness. A sense of sin conspired with a love of God to establish a moral ideal that had a religious sanction (ἀνεξικακία, κοινωφελής, μεγαλωφελής) and a rational basis (κενοσπουδία, πειθήνιος)!

and universal impulses, in the midst of which there existed, with divided authority, a hierarchy of faith and a sovereignty of reason,—a necessary moment in Greek Being, (cf. ἀγαθοποιΐα, κοινωφελής, κενοσπουδία) prior to a greater evolution. New ideas were born into the world, meeting with deep appreciation, but there was a sad lack of Titanic emotions capable of welding, with gigantic force, the various elements into an organic synthesis (ἠθοποιΐα). The age produced no inspired prophet with power to command; there was only a Chaeronean high-priest, to aspire!

ERRATA.

Page 7. For Keyon, read Kenyon.

" 8. Add Demosthenes to list of orators; for D. E. Holmes, read D. H. Holmes; for Hyperdis, read Hyperidis.

" 9. For Y. P. Boissevain, read V. P.

" 10. Read Αθησαυριστων, instead of "Λθησαυριστων"; Sylloge, instead of "Sylogge"; A. N. Jannaris, instead of "A. A. Jannaris".

" 12. Note 4. For "Inser", read Inscr.

" 14. For Note 4, read 14.

" 15. (line 12). For "till not", read not till.

" 16. Note 6. (line 6). Note following corrections: ἀλλοτριοπραγία, οἰνόληπτος οἰκοδέσποινα, συνανασώζω, ἐκπαθής.

" 20. Read associated instead of "associately". (l. 28.)

" 21. (line 16). Read καθόλου δὲ τοὺς ταῖς εὐρησιλογίαις κατασοφιζομένους.

" 25. Note 10. (line 2). Read 1251 b. 15, 25.

" 26. (line 26). Read affect, instead of "effect"; Note 13, read Matth., instead of Math.

" 29. Note 2. Read μετριότης, instead of μετριόπης.

" 30. (line 37). Read μεγαλοφροσύνη, instead of μέγαλοφροσύνη.

" 46. (line 26). Read boastfulness; (line 28), σεμνολογέω, instead of σεμνογογέω.

" 47. (line 10). Read ἐπαχθές; (line 18), δέ, instead of δὲ, (line 19), read περιϊσταμένου, instead of περιϊσταμενον; (line 38), read becomes, instead of "become".

" 50. (line 30). Read Εἴδωλ' instead of εἴδωλ'.

" 51. (line 17). Read "The sadness"; Note 1. Read -πόνημα, instead of -πὸνημα.

" 52. (line 31). Read φαντάσματα, instead of φαυτάσματα.